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INTRODUCTION 
The alIIl of this thesis is to consider the application of the 
concept of culture ln educational studies which take a tradical' 
stance. Such studies assert that inequality of educational 
achievement in complex modern societies has a more or less 
direct and significant relationship to social class and that the 
phenomenon of achievement is to be explained by strictly social 
causes. Radical accounts of education thus challenge the 
assumption that educational achievement is to be explained by a 
natural or pre-social distribution of individual 'aptitude', 
tmental ability' or 'intelligence' in the population at large. 
The outcome of this 'radical' position 1.s that if unequal 
achievement 1.n education can be explained by social causes 
related to class, such causes can be ch.a.nged through the 
processes of schooling and broader social action. 
While the idea of culture has been linked e..'Xplicitly to 
education since the mid-19th century, a particular version of 
this concept has been emphasised in sociological theories of 
education since the mid-1950s. This version has foregrounded 
the idea of a distinctive culture relative to social class. The 
purpose of this formulation of the concept of class-culture in 
such theories has been to assert the inherent trationality' of 
-2-
working class students. Working clci88 ::,LudenLs do noL fa.il 
because Lhey have noL got 'U1e bra.ins' buL because they f.XJSsess 
a logical ::,cheme and world v.1ew wh.i.ch .i.s generaLe<l by Lhe.ir 
class po::,ition and whose .inherenL logic is eiLher not recogn.i.zed 
or actively den.i.ed by the processe8 and/or content of formal 
education. 
I intend to examine closely the use and application of the 
concept of culture 1.n two rw:lical Lheories of education wh.ich 
have been very influential in eduuational research and Lheory in 
recent L.ime::,. The works to be exam.i.ned .in close detail are 
Basil Bernstein's theories of language and codes from 1958 to 
Lhe presenLl, and the work of Pdul .Willis .in 1977 and 1983, 
ma.inly Learning to Labour ( 1977). Both analyses emphasise U1e 
concepL of culture as a coherenL scheme of tmean.lrig' wh.i.ch 
expresses and reflects the principles of cohes.i.un of an 
underlying 'social structure.' While there are variations 
between Bernstein's and Willis' analyses .in Lhe significance of 
Lhe key concepts of culture and social structure, the bas.ic 
frameworks which both theorists employ are e!::IBentially 
Durkheimian. Th.is crnmuon emphasis re flee ts the general 
influence of Durkheim upon the practice of sociology in Britain 
(Demaine 198:1:29). 
lMain attention will be given to Bernstein's publications between 1958 
and 1971 which focused upon the idea of language forms and, later, 
linguistic codes. After 1971, Bernstein's attention shifted towards a 
social account of the constuction of formal kno•ledge after MF D Young 
(1971) 
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I .in Lend Lo show Lhe lim.i tatiorl!:::i of both bodies of work .ill 
gi V .lfl.!:; a causal ac..!courit of the uriequal distribution of 
educational achievement. I will also point to Lhe limitations 
of both theories in suggesting courses of intervention m 
schooling to improve the situation for work.ing class students. 
Finally, I will be arguing that these l.imilaL.ions emerge from 
the lack of resolutlon .1n both Lheor.ies of Durkheim.ian. and 
Marxist elemenLs reflecLed in the concepts of culture and class 
respectively2. 
There is an .important reason for investigating these accounts of 
education from fill cil1thropological perspective. In studies of 
education the concept of culture is assumed to be unproblematic 
it is what an.thropologists have discovered through their 
discipline. At the same time, with the application Lo education 
of a concept of culture relative to class, many of Lhe classlcal 
problems of anthropological enquiry have been transferred Lo 
educational studies wlthout being recognized for what Lhey are. 
A cla.8sic problem within anthropology is accounting for the 
apparently irrational naLure of beliefs and attitudes of members 
of other societies. The response of Durkheimian anthropology 
has been to propose a relativistic culture whereby societles are 
guided by schemes of meanlng particular to themselves. Cultures 
have thus been treated as spatio-temporal isolates (Wolf, 
1982:387). Sperber observes that the Social-Darwlnlst vision of 
19th century eLhnology has been replaced by 'a kind of cognltive 
apartheid. If we cannot be superior ln tile same world, let each 
2It is noted that the emphsis upon 1 culture 1 is an interpretation of 
Durkheim, emerging through a British tradition of sociology. 
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people live .1n lts own world' (1982:179/80). Wolf inc.licaLes 
that Lhe vis.1on of self-contained socieL.ies operating withln 
their own part.icular cultures has been based upon a v.iew of 
social interaction 'causative in i Ls own ler,ns' ( 1982: 387). 
This _perspective has made difficult a consideration of the 
impact of economic and political forces upon soe.ieties. 
Central problems which emerge from the idea of culLures as 
bounded systelll8 of meaning are the questions of account.irig for 
power arid chct.nge within such oounds. I intend Lo show that 
these general problems of sociological and anUiropological 
theory are of particular relevar1ce to the analyses of educa.Lion 
and class proposed by Bernstein and Willis and that relaLed to 
these emerging concerns is a question of the s Latus of theory 
itself. 
OrLner (1984) 
fragmentation 
eclecticism . 1.n 
and Marcus and Fischer (1986) observe a 
of 
the 
authoritative paradigms and an emerging 
fields of sociological and anthropological 
theory since Lhe 1960s. Within this movemenL Ortner observes a 
general trend of social analysis away from a primary 
pre-occupation wiU1 n1ctCro systems arid towards an actor- oriented 
perspecLive within 'the system' (1984:127.). She also observes 
that these emerging actor-oriented _perspectives 'were elaborated 
lil opposiLlon to the dominant, essentially Pa.rsonian/ 
Durkheimian view of tl1e world as ordered by rules and norms' 
(1984:146) [o~iginal emphasis]. 
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Ma~us and Fischer slate that: 
The authority of "gr-d.nd theory" styles seems suspended 
for the moment 1.n favour of a close conslderaLion of 
such issues ~ contextuality, the meaning of sc.x.:.ial 
l.i.fe Lo Lhose who enact .it, and Lhe explanaL.ion of 
exceplions and indeter,ninarrts rather than the 
regularities in phenomena observed (1986:8). 
The shift of focus from the 'regularilies' of systems towards 
'exceptions' within them reflects a generally recognized need 
for social analysis to account for change. Marcus and Fischer 
suggest that this need to account for change ha.8 led to a 
disaffection 
further that: 
with 'grand theory' ( 1986: 15) . They observe 
the problem of the moment is less one of explaining 
changes within broad encompa.sslrig frwneworlIB of Lheory 
from a concern to preserve the purpose and legitimacy 
of such theorizing, than of exploring innovative ways 
of describing at a microscopic level the process of 
change itself ( 1986: 15). 
A compa.ru::;on of the analytical methods of Bernstein and Willis 
confirms these observations. A period of nineteen years 
separates Bernstein's initial publications (1958) and Learning 
to Labour (1977). Bernstein's theory, as will be shown, follows 
Durkheim and Parsons in its emphasis upon an over-arching system 
and attempts to give macro causes of student behaviour. Willis 
explicitly places primary emphasis upon 'ethnography' as a means 
of reg.is ter ing 'human agency' at work ( 1977: 3-4). There is, 
however, an antagonism, not always concealed, towards 'for,na.l' 
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theory which accompa.rues Willis' emphasls upon ethnographic 
desc..;r lptlon and the need Lo .(ocus upon 'the real' : 
It is necessary above all to approach the real now in 
one way or another - one-sl<l.edly, elliptically or not. 
The eLhnographic account, for all its faults, records a 
crucial level of human agency which is persistently 
overlooked or denied ... It must nevertheless be 
specifically registered somewhere in theory if theory 
pretends to any relevance at all. Theories must be 
judged ultimately for the adequacy they display to the 
understanding of the phenomenon they purport to explain 
- not to themselves (1977:194). 
What I intend to show, however, is that a properly articulated 
theory is necessary 1.n order to recognize the limitations of 
observations of 'reality'. In my analysis I want to affirin that 
there is a need for theory to engage treal.ity' and to be 
constantly modified by practical applications. 
Bernstein's .impersonal formalism contrasts with W.ill.is' 
committed engagemenL with 'the real'. For all its shortcomings, 
which I intend to show, Bernstein remains consistent, in Marcus 
and Fischer's terms, in a concern to preserve the purpose and 
legit.ima.cy of such theorizing. My observation . lS that a 
comparison of the analyses of Bernstein and Willis indicates a 
dlminlshing concern for a comprehensive, rigorous theory - that 
.1s a conceptual framework which attempts to register all 
s.ignificant factors in the social phenomenon being stud.led and 
to postulate further causes and explanations from the fnunework 
which is developed. 
I lntend to show lhat the basic problems wiLh Willis' analysis 
are due to a lack of consistent theory. For all his 
protestations about agency the analysis is unable to register 
any adequate account of it. The concept of culture which is the 
prliOary concept that he employs subswnes entirely the behaviour 
of agents.3 With few exceptions (Connell 1983, Marcus 1986) 
this cont:r-dd.iction has gone largely unnoticed by eormnentators. 
Anthony Giddens offers a notable example of the lack of such an 
adequate critique, and close attention will be given to his 
account of Learning to Labour. I can only assume that the 
reason for this relatively uncritical acceptance of Willis' mode 
of analysis has been an inattention to the precise detail of the 
basic conceptual articulations in the writing. My mode of 
analysis aceordlngly will be to give a close reading of the 
account of the basic concepts of 'eullure' and 'rationality' a8 
lhey appear in the work. A similarly close reading will also be 
given of these concepts as they appear in Bernstein's wriLing in 
order to indicate the conunonality between the two theories and 
their resulting limitations. 
In the first chapter I will briefly outline the problem of 
unequal educational achievement and the traditional explanation 
of its cause by individual 'aptitude'. I will also describe the 
developnent of a sociology of education, particularly in Britain 
in the 1950s and 1960s, which indicates a growing concern to 
d~lUilent social causes of educational achievement relative to 
class. The concept of 'class' , however, emerges from the 
3Bernstein's later analysis (1982) recognized the need to account for 
change. The analysis is equally unable to register and adequate account 
of change because the idea of code also co1pletely subsu1es agency. 
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demographic Lra.di t±on of 'politlcal arithmetic' and the 
associated social theory reflects a conceptual framework derived 
from Durkheim. I will also indicate how the sociology of 
education hci.8 s1.nce Parsons 
structural-functional sociology. 
been heavily influenced by 
While some uommen la·Lors have 
registered thls influence (Demaine, 1981; Purvis and Hale, 1983; 
Whitty, 1985) they have not indicated .its 
. . pervasiveness in 
current 'radical' theories. 
In the second chapter I will isolate Lhe quite profound 
lnfluenue of Parsons upon Bernsteln. Thls influence can be seen 
in the way Bernstein articulates the basic concepts of culture 
and social structure through the idea of 'code'. The break 
which Bernstein makes with structural-functionalist theories 
occurs through his emphasis upon the concept of class. ·This 
break, I will argue, is theoretically incomplete. 
Chapter 3 will address Willis' basic theoretical presuniptions 
and attempt to relate these concerns to the general developnents 
.1n social theory noted earlier. While Wlllls' concerns emerge 
a8 a response to 'reproduction theory' from French and Amerlcan 
sources, I wlll argue that th.is analysis also exh.ibits key 
concerns wh.ich are part of a continuum of the practice of 
sociology within the British tradition. 
In Chapter 4 I will contrast the key theoretical elements of 
Bernstein and Willis to indicate the essentially Durkheimian 
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f rdffiework and Lhe corresponding 'functionalist' perspective 
wh.i.ch they share. A compcu· ison will be made be Lween the two 
theories focusing on the concept of culture and how it 1.s 
related Lo cla.Bs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE 
AS A SOCIOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO THE 
CONCEPT OF NATURAL APTITUDE 
Unequal Educational Achievement and the Concept .of Aptitude 
Mass education is a phenomenon of the last hundred years in most 
Western countries. From the mid-19th century it took the fonn 
of a basic compulsory primary education in most of these 
societies. Since the Second World War some degree of compulsory 
secondary education has also been widely instituted. 
Systems of formal education now vary widely from highly 
selective systems (West Germany) to comprehensive systems (USA, 
UK). The broader picture, however, remains fairly constant. 
That is, formal educational success is achieved by a relatively 
small proportion of the relevant age group. In West Germany 
some 9% of students graduate from senior secondary schooling 
,,, (Husen, 1983:456). In Australia a survey undertaken by Radford. 
in 1959-60 established that only 2% of the sons of semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers went on to university. By comparison some 
30% of the sons of professionals and managers successfully 
entered university (Connell, 1977:161 cited in Austin, 
1984:6). 
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The common tradi t ional explanation for the inequitabl e 
distribution of educational achievement has been based on t he 
notion of 'aptitude' or individual ability. This notion when 
offered as an explanation for large-scale social dif ferences 
presLUDes a spontaneous distribution of capacities according to a 
natural and ultimately biological order. In her analysis of the 
history of the notion of 'aptitude' Bisseret (1979) indicates 
its growing popularity in the second half of the 19th century as 
a 'strictly biological causal process' - emphasis being given to 
its biolog.ical aspect by the increasing .influence of the work of 
Darwin. 
Social disparities were no longer relative to a 
man-made social order but belonged to a new 
transcendental order of an irreducible and determinant 
biological nature. Men were categorized by the same 
criteria of differentiation as those applied .to animal 
breeding and agriculture (Bisseret, 1979:14).1 
Teese observes that the assumption behind this pre-social 
distribution of 'aptitude' in education wa.s a ' .. • concentration 
of rationality within the middle class home and its diminished 
appearance and sul:Jordination to the developnent of impulses of 
nature in the working class home ..• ' (1980:16-17). This is in 
essence a contrast between reason and nature. 
lThe notion of a pre-social distribution of aptitude in complex 
societies which finds expression in analyses of education clearly 
parallels the Social-Darwinist concerns of 19th century ethnology with 
the evolutionary stages of primitive races and the 1 irrationality ' of 
1 savages'. The 'savage' in contrast ~ith the civilized individual is 
described by Spencer (according to Stocking ) as ' improvident , impulsive, 
incapable of abstraction, governed by fixity of habit, merging 
imperceptibly over time with racial instinct ' (Stocking , 1968: 202 ) 
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The concept of 'aptitude' as a cause of inequality of 
educational achievement derived not only from public sources but 
also · became established as a primary concept wi t hin educational 
research itself. Connell et al (1982) indicate t hat in 
Australia the first of the social sciences to have an impact on 
the shaping of 
growing field of 
the question of educational inequality was the 
educational psychology and in particular the 
work undertaken in the research and guidance branches of the 
State Education Departments and the Australian Council for 
Educational Research in the 1930s (1982:24). The basic premise 
which guided and shaped this research was that of the normal 
distribution of intelligence which cla.imed to show that each 
lndividual was endowed with a more or less fixed mental 
capacity, usually called 'intelligence' , and that this was 
distributed in more or less fixed proportions, with a few very 
bright, many in the middle, and a few subnormal ( 1982: 24). 
Keddie ( 1973) observes that a further basic asslllllption 
underlying 
individual 
this mode 
child as 
of research was the perception of the 
an object that could be measured 
'objectively'. This research, she argues, neglected crucial 
social elements such as the effects of institutional contexts 
and teachers' ways of assessing and typifying students (1973:7). 
In addition to psychological studies of educational attainment, 
a second body of research which emerged in Britain in the 1920s 
focused on socio-economic rather than individual factors in the 
distribution of educational achievement. Such factors included. 
such key aspects of family background as the father's 
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professional staLus arid 1.ncome. This Lrad.i.Lion, termed. 
'political arithmetic', aimed lo provide a quantitative picture 
of British socieLy within a political framework which adv~ted 
refor,us of Lhe education system directed at bringing about 
greater equality of educational achievement between children of 
different social classes. In particular political 
arithmeticians tackled questions related to the 'social waste' 
of able children by focusing upon the unjust distribution of 
opportunities for educational advancement granted to children 
from different social classes (Purvis and Hale, 1983:1)2. 
The introduction of class into educational analysis was a 
significant developnent in statistical studies of this kind. 
The concept of class in these studies, however, took the form of 
a hierarchical continuum of status. In Britain these studies 
relied simply on the categories employed by the Registrar-
General (Demaine 1981:30). In practice, class differences were 
documented in relation to the numerical contribution which each 
class made to the composition of the highest ability groups so 
that the degree of 'social waste' could be quantified (Teese, 
1980:1). This methodology involved slotting individuals into 
status categories, assessing by I.Q. tests and comparing the 
relative 'ability levels' of categories. In addition to its 
inert conception of class, there were two further limitations of 
this 'sociology' . Firstly, it held to the idea of an 
objectively quantifiable a-social aptitude, and secondly, while 
registering that there were social factors which had effects on 
educational achievement, it offered no sustained theoretical 
explanation of why this was so. 
2This methodology was also used within a conservative political frame•ork 
to indicate the validity of social differentiation through education. 
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This kind of research was conducted in Australia from the 
1940s. Studies conducted by the Austral.ian Council for 
EducaLional Research estimated that some 10% of the school 
population could go into un.iversiLy, while sLudies by La Nauze 
indicated that only 1% of state school students did in fact go 
(Connell eL al, 1982:25). 
In the years after World War II there was a massive expansion of 
secondary education .1n Australia, Brita.in and elsewhere. In 
Australia the enrolments of secondary students rose from 
approximately 181,000 in 1945, to 771,000 in 1965, to 1,100,000 
in 1975 (Connell et al, 1982:19). Such a move may be seen as 
pa.rt of the more general move into the twelfare state' and the 
influence of Keynesian economics on accepted roles of government 
(Austin, 1984:150). Key events in the educational setting 
include the 1944 Education Act in Britain involving the 
expa.ns.1on of the nt.miber of grammar school places and the 
abol.ition of fees, and the 1946 amendment to the Australian 
Constitution which within the general expansion of welfare 
benefits enabled the Commonwealth Government to provide 
'benefits to students' (Clause ... Section 51) (Austin, Xllla, 
1984:150). However, despite expansion of educational 
opportunity to the general population, the problem of unequal 
educational achievement rema.ined. As explanations were sought 
the issue of culture became a focal point in the sociology of 
education. 
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SLrucLural-FuncLlonal.ist Theory .1n EducaLion 
In 1959 Talcott Parson::; published an artlc..:le on The School Class 
as a Soc.ial Sy::;Lem which applled a sLrucLural-functional theory 
to schooling and ultlma.tely proved influential in providing 
certaln baslc concepts in British sociology of educaL.ion. In 
contrast to 
arithmeticians, 
the emp.irici::;t approach of the political 
structural-functionalism offered a systematic 
analysis within an elaborate theory of socialization. In 
addition, it fashioned a particular concept of culture which 
offered a causal explanation of the unequal distribution of 
educational attairunent for the various strata of society. The 
prcx..!ess of socialization offered by structural-functionalist 
Lheory attempts Lo explain the construction of the hl.1Il8.Il subject 
through the .internalization of a culture which is held in common 
by members of a society (Demaine, 1981:15). 
P.drsons' analysis of education was essentially conservative, 
stressing how the education system allocates status and 
dlstr.i.butes individuals into differential adult roles and 
related value orientatlons (Demaine, 1981:27). Within the 
Parsonian framework educational selection was seen to be, to use 
Parsons' tenn, 'genuinely assortive' (1961:436) in relation to 
both socio-economic s ·tatus of the child's family and 'individual 
ability' (Parsons, 1961:436). Far from challenging the idea 
that 'ability' operated as a significant cause of unequal 
education attainment, the theory of Parsons and his followers 
actually confirmed this view. 
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Parsons indeed goes to some pains to document the relationship 
between educational levels achieved by occupational groups and 
their 'ability (as measured by I.Q.)' (1961:438). The appeal to 
I.Q. however is not of central importance. Parsons is 
essentially concerned to explain the idea of 'ability' in social 
teI1I1S. Unequal outcomes of education are explained by reference 
Lo a 'differentlatlon of levels of capacity to act ln accord 
with [common] values' (1961:440) embodied in the culture. 
Within structural-functional theory, then, the attainment of 
educational levels is not merely dependent upon a level of 
natural 'ability' which .1s reflected in 'cognitive' eapauity. 
The notion of 'ability' .is exlended lo a.c...'Count for the 'capacity 
to act' in accord with common values dlctaled by society. 
I will consider P.-a.rsons' conceptualization of culture in greater 
detail in the analysis of Bernstein. At tl1is point, however, it 
should be noted that this formulation of culture involves both 
cognitive and affective aspects their combined effects 
generating the 'moral' , values on which social cohesion rests. 
The particular 'moral' value created by socialization within the 
school is the 'conman valuation of achievement' which is shared 
by 'units with different statuses in the system' (1961:446). 
According to Parsons, this coIIBnon valuation enables individuals 
to accept the status accorded to them through educational 
selection. It also provides the principal mechanism by which a 
system of distribution sorts individuals according to a capacity 
to act in accord with what is socially required of them. As 
indicated this capacity is both effective and cognitive. 
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StrucLural-functional sociology .i.n BriLa.i.n confirmed the use of 
basic concepts of culture/ socialization/internalization in the 
social analysis of educ..!atlon (Demaine, 1981:16). Among the 
factors which became significant in this sociology were the 
material and 'cultural' resources of the family, the school, and 
the 'community' (Demaine, 1981:31). Most importantly, however, 
structural-functional sociology gives currency to the concept of 
culture as constituting a pervasive system of meanin.g.3 
This, in turn, issues in an extremely conservative overall 
picture of education as a socialization process following from a 
conunon culture which assumes that 'what persons are can only be 
understood in te!'TDB of a set of beliefs and values which define 
what they ought to be' (Parsons, 1982:134) (oriqinal emphasis). 
Radical Theories of F.ducation 
What I will be arguing is that reformist sociological theories 
of educatlon have assumed the primacy of -the concept of culture, 
with its emphasis upon 'meHning ' , derived from 
structural-functionalist theory ln explalning unequal education 
at tainmen L. Thus, the fundamental stance of reformist 
sociological accounts of education needs to be seen not only as 
a reaction to the conservative a-social and individualistic 
analyses of psychological practice, but also as a modification 
of existing theory. According to this modification, the system 
of educational selection through schooling is seen to be 
3Parsons' general definition of culture is 'a system of generalized 
symbols and their 11eanings' (_1982: 141). 
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inherently inequitable in Lhe chances of succe8s that it 
offers the respective classes from the outset. This move 
conLrasLs wiLh sLrucLural- functionallsL accow1b.'.) LhaL view the 
system of selection as a 'genuine' sorting mechanism functioning 
to disLribute lndi.vlduals to a continuum of status roles 
according to their 
roles . 4 
'capacity to t ) . ac in accord with those 
It is necessary to view refonnist sociological analyses of 
education as a modified extension of structural-functionalism 
because their limitations both in accounting for the social 
causes of working class student failure, and in proposing 
programs of reform, relate to how the basic analytical concepts 
of 'culture', 'rationality' and 'meaning' are construed and 
deployed. What needs to be questioned is why these concepts 
become the particular focus of sociological analyses which take 
a reformist stance in relation to the problem .of unequal 
distribution of educational attainment between classes. 
The fundamental move of Bernstein is to posit a relativistic 
view of culture that is relative to class. This contrasts with 
the Pa.rsonian theory which held the idea of a culture coIIUllOn to 
the whole society. Willis makes a more radical move, largely by 
implication, to suggest that the working class is the bearer of 
culture while the dominant class is culture-less. The outcome 
of both theories is to place emphasis upon the notion of a 
culture specific to the working class. The primary emphasis 
4Parsons states that the elementary school class 1 ••• is an eibodiment of 
the fundamental A1erican value of equality of opportunity in that it 
places value both on initial equality and differential achieve1ent-' 
(1961:445} 
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upon culture as a tsystem of meaning' is ma.i.nLained.. Fa.i.lure 
.is Lo be explained by the fact that the processes of schooling 
do nol recognlze the different cultural system of coherent.. 
mean.i.ng, arnl aLtendenL modes of behaviour, of working class 
students or what causes them. 
Bernstein and Willis, .in attempting to explain tl1e tresistance' 
of the behaviour8 and attitudes of working class students to 
formal educalion, have posited a concept of culture which 
requires a level of reality underlying the surface behaviour of 
individuals. This underlying level of reality which guides 
surface behaviour is seen as collective in nature, forming and 
constraining individual action to varying degrees. In Bernstein 
this notion takes the forin of codes. In Willis the underlylng 
'rational' principles of student behaviour are construed. as 
'cultural logic'. 
For Bernstein, rationality is given to individual subjects 
through proces8es of social interaction whereby cUl ordered 
universe of significance .ts generated. in relation to the 
environment and handed on. Rationality is construed as the 
significance which objects and persons are given within a scheme 
or 'code' prior to the interactions of subjects. The logic of 
codes relative to class is envisaged primarily as one of 
difference rather than domination and opposition. 
In setting up the notion of 'cultural logic', which is set 
against class structure, Willis, 1n Learning to Labour, 
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construes all action as trational' in the sense that it contains 
at some level an intention and a purpose expressing a critique 
of dominant fonns. It is the relentless logic of class 
structure expressed through oppressive fonns which at key points 
gives structure to and produces the oppositional logic of the 
working class. The system of tcultural logic' is also prior to 
the interactions of tagents'. 
In both analyses the idea of culture realizes a collective logic 
whose basic imperative . lS to enforce social cohesion among 
members of the working class. 
The radical analyses of Bernstein and Willis have a fundamental 
concern with the role of education as a significant causal 
factor in social class. What I will be arguing is that the 
sociological apparatus which they deploy 1s premised on a 
relatively harmonious tfunctioning' society. It is therefore 
necessary to examine if and how their basic conceptual 
categories can be wedded to a concern to account for factors 
operating through schooling and causing the relegation of 
individuals to a specific class position. This kind of enquiry 
is given further relevance by the fact that there are current 
appeals from influential radical theorists of education, 
particularly in America, for a renewed emphasis upon 'culturd.l' 
analysis (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985; Apple, 1982, 1987; 
Kickbush and Everhart, 1985; Glroux and McLaren, 1986). (See 
Appendix) A central problem to emerge from this 'cultural' 
analysis lS 
meaningfulness 
that 
of 
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it immediately places emphasis on the 
behaviour .1n class-based groupings and 
contexts and a corresponding de-emphasis upon lhe limitations of 
LhaL behaviour and its retrograde elements .1n relation lo 
concerns of race, ethnicity and gender. The basic problem is 
that if all behaviour is guided by culture then all behaviour is 
by definition 'rational' in reference to this scherne. 5 These 
theorists also recogni~e the need for a radical critique of the 
retrograde elements of working class practice. 
What emerges from -their writing, however, 1.s a cultural 
relativism which 1.s not reconciled in theoretical ter,ns with a 
recognized need for critique based upon a more general 
'objective' specification of human needs and values. 
5 The Durkheimian emphasis of these theories may be contrasted with an alternative 
Weberian approach in which the concept of rationality takes a much less pervasive 
role in social life. 'Rationality 1 in this sense is limited to purposive action of 
individuals and constitutes but one element of social action (Heber, 1968:21 ). 
Something of this perspective is required in radical theories of education if an 
account is to be given of the operation of power in class through the persistence 
of activities and practices which reinforce the subordination of the working class 
subjects because they have no awareness of the consequences of such practices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BASIL BERNSTEIN: THE THEORY OF LANGUAGE FORMS 
AND LINGUISTIC CODES 
The Theory of Language Forms 
Some brief general observations should be ma.de about the __ 
educatlonal analysis of Basil Bernstein between 1958 and 1982. 
This sociological analysis took as its initial concern the 
'problem of educability as this is conceived in industrial 
societies' (1971:123). There is an underlying concern in 
Bernstein's analysis for the need for an equitable provision of 
education based upon rationalist principles. This concern is 
constant throughout the long period of his theorizing and 
reflects Durkheim's similar conmitment to a rationalist 
education necessary to meet the requirements of modern complex 
society (Durkheim, 1972:217). 
It should also be noted that Bernstein's theories of language 
forms and, later, of linguistic ccxies, involve a large number of 
publications over a considerable period of time (1958 to the 
present). 
emphasis 
These statements have reflected a number of shifts of 
and have also been the subject of important 
• 
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controversies in educational, sociological and linguistic theory 
(Demaine, 1981; Bisseret, 1979; Labov, 1969). The aim of the 
analysis provided here is not to give an overview of these 
interpretations but to indicate that Bernstein's basic concerns 
reflect certain long-term pre-occupations of British sociology 
of a Durkheimian nature. The novel aspect of Bernstein's 
analysis is the prllllB.cy emphasis placed upon language and more 
of language use. This reflects a particularly 
pre-occupation 
forms 
with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, i.e. that 
language, perceived as 'patterns', determines the shaping of 
perception and the logical operations of speakers. Wedded to 
this perspective from the start is a Durkheimian vision of 
society. Thus language is considered as: 
... one of the most important means of initiating, 
synthesizing and REINFORCING ways of thinking, feeling 
and behaviour which are ftmctionally related to the 
social group (1971:43) [emphasis added]. 
As the theory of language forms develops into the theory of 
linguistic-codes, the tmderlying Durkheimian framework becomes 
refracted through Parsons' reading of Durkheim. In other words, 
Bernstein is drawn towards the Durkheimian elements in Parsons' 
theory of social systems. Parsons' theory of social systems 
gives primary emphasis to the ideas of corrununication and meaning 
within a coded system of language (Parsons, 1982:225). Parsons' 
influence leads Bernstein to emphasize the language patterns of 
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classes as distinctive forms of communication involving specific 
sets of meanings generated through codes. 
In two early articles, Some sociological determinants of 
perception (1958) and A Public Language: Some sociological 
=i=m=p=l=i~c~a~t=i=o=n=s~--"o~f~~l~i_n.gu.....,.__;~i~s~t_i_c~_f_o_rm _ (1959), Bernstein's basic 
concern was to suggest social causes for the 'resistance of the 
working class to certain educational processes': 
It 1.s suggested that the lower the social strata the 
greater the resistance to formal education and 
learning, and this is a function of the social 
structure of that strata. This resistance is expressed 
1.n many different ways and levels, e.g. critical 
problems of discipline, non-acceptance of values of the 
teacher, the failure to develop and feel the need for 
an extensive vocabulary, a preference for descriptive 
rather than analytical cognitive process. (1971:24.) 
The term 'resistance' has become the focal concept of cultural 
accounts of education after Willis. 
In attempting to delineate the social causes of this problem, 
Bernstein suggested the working class had 'a specific mode of 
perceiving and feeling' (1971:24) which was different from that 
of the middle class and this mode of perception was caused by 
the different principles of social cohesion on which working 
class solidarity was based. Bernstein's primary move involves a 
reworking of Durkheim's concepts of mechanical and organic 
solidarity to suggest that both forms exist 1.n the 
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dif ferenLiaLed strucLures of modern complex societies Lhus 
concurririg wi Lh P.d.rson.s. 1 
Bernstein suggested that modes of language, and more 
particularly, modes of speech in modern, complex class societies 
exhibited two ma.Jar 'ideal' forms (1971:51). These forms he 
labelled as 'public' and 'formal' language. Public language-use 
realizes and reinforces an orientation to socially conunon 
experience of the social group. Formal language-use, in 
contrast, realizes in speakers a relative emphasis on the 
elements of 'separateness and difference' in the experience of 
individual speakers (lg71:47). 2 
Bernstein suggested that the differences between public and 
formal lariguage induce and reinforce in speakers cl.if f erenl 
paLLern.s of perception (1971:36), orlentaLions Lo causaliLy 
(1971:50), levels of 'conceptualization' (1971:50) and orders of 
symbolism (1971:42). These orientations to specific logical 
procedures and patterns of perception are causal elements in the 
types of social cohesion which are reali~ed.. He described the 
basic d.ifferences between the inferred effects of speech forms 
in perceptual terms, as a sensitivity to the content of objects 
(public language) versus a sensitivity to the structure of 
objects (formal language) (1971:24-5). This issued in a 
dlstinetion beLween language-use that emphasizes the givenness 
lParsons notes that Durkheim left open the question of the existence of 
mechanical solidarity in complex modern society. He observes that 
Durkheim associated this concept with primitive simpler societies 
(Parsons, 1982:208). Durkheim suggests an inverse relationship between 
mechanical solidarity and the emergence of moral individualism 
(1972:144). Durkhei~'s account does not suggest that two modes of 
solidarity are directly rel ated to class. 
2At this stage Bernstein suggested that language forms reflected patterns 
of Geme1nschaft and Gesellschaft respectively (1971:54). 
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of exper1.ence, and results ill descriptive cognltive processes 
about objects ( 1971: 33) and language-use thaL induces analytical 
cognitive processes through which objects are perceived to be 
llnked in a conceptual sLructure. 
Fonnal language-use was seen to promote curiosity in that 
'objects in the present are not taken as given, but become 
centres for enquiry and starting points for relationships' 
( 1971: 24 )3 • This orientation to relationshlps induces ln the 
child an awareness of structure, 'an awareness of the formal 
ordering of the environment, notions of its extensions in time 
and space, and so the beginning of primitive interpretive 
concepts' (1971:29). 
'rational' (1971:29). 
The middle class world is thus very 
The middle class child grows up in a 
'finely and extensively controlled environment' (1971:29) which 
is organized with reference to the distant future. This 
organization is 'rational' in that connections are constantly 
made between means and distant ends. 
The working class world, in contrast, is not oriented towards 
distant ends, nor are connections constantly made between means 
and ends. The speech patterns of the working class emphasize 
'expressive symbolism' : gesture, tone, change of volume and 
physical set and point to emotive rather than 'rational' content 
JThis formulation ;irrors very clearly Durkheim's view of an evolving 
rationalis~. He com~ents: 1 (T]hought has as its aim not the 
reproduction of a given reality, but the construction of a future 
reality. It follows that the value of ideas can no longer be assessed 
by reference to objects, but must be determined by their degree of 
untility, their more or less ·advantageous" character' (Durkheim, 
1972:251) [original emphasis). 
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(1971:33). The stress is on the present; the future is not 
par Licular ly relevant. 
Necessarily, the child lives in the here-and-now 
experience of his world, in which the time-span of 
anticipation or expectancy is very brief, and this is 
reinforced by the lack of a rigorous working out of 
connections between means and distant ends ... Sustained 
curiosity is not fostered or rewarded, as the answers to 
questions rarely lead beyond the object or further than 
a simple statement about the object. The social 
structure continues to reinforce the early patterning of 
perception (1971:33-34). 
The working class family environment induces a tendency towards 
innnediate gratification of sensual appetites: tRelative to the 
middle classes the postponment of present pleasure for future 
gratifications will be found difficult' (1971:32). 
More generally, working class language use is public in the 
sense that it is a mode of language seen to reinforce compliance 
to group solidarity. The ensuing conservatism and resistance to 
change in the public language of the working class contrasts 
with the 'interest in novelty' characteristic of middle class 
speech for,ns. The public language, then, induces 'a tendency 
to accept and respond to authority which inheres in the form of 
a social relationship rather than in reasoned or logical 
principles' (1971:50). The tfunction' of public language is to 
generate group solidarity and sameness rather than to promote a 
treasoning' individuated consciousness. 
While Bernstein offers a social account of the working class 
characteristics of impulse gratification, lack of curiosity, and 
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inability to handle analytical thought, he accepts and even 
reinforces the view that these are actually characteristics of 
the working class. Instead of accounting for these 
characteristics as naturally occurring phenomena like earlier 
analyses, Bernstein 
differential modes 
implies that 
of social 
they are to be explained by 
organization. They have, 
therefore, social causes. However, if Bernstein's concern is to 
expose the 'rational' aspects of working class behaviour this 
kind of account remains extremely restricted in the terms in 
which it does so. The stance taken by Bernstein differs from 
conservative accotmts in only one aspect that there is a 
social cause of the 'resistant' practices of working class 
children in education. It lS significant that the 
characteristics of working class mentality are construed as 
absences or a lack of certain objective traits (which the middle 
class have) . 
The explanation of working class 'resistance' to the processes 
of education is explained through a 'connnunicative dissonance' 
(Teese, 1980:22) with reference to the 'formal' processes of 
logical reasoning. The everyday speech of the two classes .ts 
seen to exhibit either an interest in such processes or a 
relative lack of interest depending on its underlying mode of 
social cohesion. The middle class, through predominantly formal 
language-use, realizes the unique relationship of the speaker to 
the social and physical environment and so focuses in a 
relatively explicit way the causes of, and reasons for, events. 
In the case of the working class the focus of speech events is 
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primarily upon the status-authority of its members so that a 
pre-occupation with reasons and causes is not a pre-domi nant 
feature of this mode of language use. Reasons and causes which 
are given have a tendency to reflect the authority of structure 
of social units within the class, in particular the family 
(1971:32). 
education 
These differences, then, become crucial in an 
whose practices are perceived to be built upon 
analytical principles generated by formal language use. 
Underlying these initial distinctions is a ha.sic contrast 
between an enquiring and 'analytical' mentality and a 
'descriptive' mentality which has a tendency to accept rather 
than challenge and enquire into 'what is' ( 1971: 4 7) . This 
distinction reflects Bernstein's reading of Durkhelm. Bernstein 
suggests a basic contr--d.St is made between the relative emphasis 
upon 'affect' and 'logic' in differing forms of social 
solidarity (Bernstein 1971:46)4. 
The Theory of Linguistic Codes 
In 1962 Bernstein introduced the notion of 'code' - meaning an 
underlying 'regulative principle' (1971:12) embcxlied in language 
use and generated by the social structure. 
4This contrast derives from a reading of Durkheim 1 s evolutionary 
perspective on forms of society - from primitive society bound by a 
uniform conscience collective to complex societies characterized by a 
division of labour with greater emphasis on individual characteristics 
of its members. There is a need for complex society to generate 
patterns of co-operation, based upon reasoned principles when compared 
with primitive societies. It is noted , however , that Durkheim hi~self 
made no such simple distinction between affect and logic. 
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The introduction of the concept of code into his analysis 
makes a significanl shift .1n emphasis from Bernstein's original 
proposl tions about llliiguage f onns per se. The concep t of co<le 
has two specific effects on the theory. Firstly, it links in a 
more explicit causal manner social structure and language forms 
and explains differences in surface features of language forms 
by referring to Lhe underlying tregulative principles' which 
generaLe and shape those forms. Secondly, it stresses the 
systematic nature of working class practice within a coherent 
'coded' scheme. 
social structure. 
The concept of code gives primary emphasis to 
(This emphasis reflects the Durkheimian 
influence on British sociology generally) . In all of 
Bernstein's subsequent writings the concept of a given social 
structure is the primary concept . . It is the social structure 
which generates speech forms and attendent 'modes of 
rationality' ( 1971: 120). The concept of code also situates the 
cognitive processes outlined above within a scheme of 
'structured. meanings'. This move reflects the concurrence of 
Bernstein with Parsons regarding the basic elements of their 
respective theories. Code, then, is both a realization and an 
instrument of 'cultural' rationality. In essence, the concept 
of code is cultural rationality which finds objectified form in 
systems of language-use which function to: 
initiate, generalize and reinforce special types of 
relationship with the environment and thus create for the 
individual particular dimensions of significance •.. From 
this point of view the social structure transforms 
language possibility into a specific code which elicits, 
generalizes and reinforces those relationships necessary 
for its continuance (1971:76). 
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As indicated, Bernstein differs from Parsons in one principal 
respect. 
rationality' 
For Bernstein, systems of meaning or 'forms of 
become relative to class divisions: 'Complex 
societies involve various forms of rationality which may be 
differentially distributed among their members' (Bernstein: 
1971:120). 
While acknowledging that the working class and middle class have 
differing propensities to adopt the conventions of formal logical 
processes, he views this difference as essentially caused by 
social factors. The working class then, far from being 
'irrational', has its own form of 'rationality', that is, a 
logical ordering of the environment through particular socially 
generated 
(1971:135)5 
systems of meanings and 'intellectual procedures' 
There is a basic unresolved problem, however, in 
Bernstein's account of 'rationali:ty' . On the one hand 
'rationality' is relative to a particular socially generated 
scheme. At the same time schemes exist on a hierarchical 
continutnn of rationality. Education is perceived to be, in its 
very nature, dedicated to the creation of an analytical mentality 
over a relatively inert, 'descriptive' mentality which merely 
accepts what is given. The theory, therefore, endorses the idea 
of the 'progress of reason itself' (Teese, 1980:25). Similarly, 
the concept of code, while stressing the systematic and coherent 
nature of working class practice, maintains the earlier polarity 
of 'affect' and 'logic' (1971:46) and in so doing holds to the 
swhile Bernstein employed the notion of 'intelligence 1 in his early 
empirical investigations, the purpose was to de1onstrate that classes 
had relatively equal levels of I.e. 1easured by non-verbal factors 
(1971:62-3). 
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idea of an objective hierarchy of logic. In ~ttempting to 
refuLe t he notion of an objective 'aptitude' Bernstein maintains 
the idea of objective reason. I inLend to show, l a ter, how this 
notion of an objective hierarchy is highly significant . 
In the developing theory of linguistic coo.es Bernstein linked the 
Whorfian emphasis on 'language patterns' with the sociological 
concept of 'collective representations' derived from Durkheim. 
Bernstein comments: 
... in Primitive Classifications and The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim attempted to 
derive the basic categories of thought from the 
structuring of social relation. It i~ beside the point 
as to his success. He raised the whole question of the 
relation between the classifications and frames of the 
symbolic order and the structuring of experience. In 
his study he pointed to the implicit, condensed, 
symbolic structure of mechanical solidarity and the 
more explicit and differentiated symbolic structures of 
organic solidarity (1971:171). 
Bernstein's dual emphasis upon language patterns and collective 
representations is not concerned principally with 'categories of 
thought' or discrete concepts expressed in words, nor with 
beliefs. The principle concern is with 'language patterns' or 
'fashions of speaking' (1971:122) or 'speech systems' 
(1971:136). These very patterns of language-use, however, 
become 'collective representations' in that they symbolize the 
particular mooe of social solidarity of the class ln question in 
that they express 'the intellectual and social procedures [of 
particular classes] by which individuals relate themselves to 
their environment' (1971:135). There is, however, an ambiguity 
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about the concept of code from this refonnulation. On the one 
hand 'cod.es' are viewed as a basic and limited set of 
'regulative principles' (1971:12) which reflect the organizing 
modes of solidarity through 'intellectual or social procedures' 
which correspond to them. On the other hand, language itself 
may be viewed as a coded 'pattern' or pattern of meanings (after 
Parsons). In this sense, language is a total coded system of 
meanings. Both senses of code occur in Bernstein's theorizing 
and are not resolved. This ambiquity may also be seen to 
reflect Durkheim's own ambivalence on the precise nature of 
collective representations which refer to both 'the mode of 
thinking, conceiving or perceiving and to that which is thought, 
conceived or perceived' (Lukes 1972:7). 
In the historical developnent of his theory, Bernstein is drawn 
towards the Parsonian concepts of meaning and culture. As a 
result he tends to emphasize the notion of code as a system of 
specific meanings and to downplay the notion of code as 
principles which generate procedures. In 1963 Parsons described 
language as: 'a generalized medium of communication through the 
use of given meaning within a code' (Parsons, 1982:225) 
[emphasis added]. 
For Parsons the flll1ction of language is to provide stability to 
the system of social relations. This definition contains the 
key elements of Parsons' work which were influential in 
Bernstein's theory. Primary emphasis is given to the idea of 
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language as a system of communicalion Lhrough. meanings which 
emerge in a structured code. These meanings are in turn 
regarded as functions of the interaction of participants in the 
system of social relations (P.d.rsons 1982: 134). This account 
suggests that objects (including other persons) in the 
environment are given significance by the way in which they 
enter into an existing system of social relations. This 
'meaning' . lS thus stabilized by the cultural system and 
'internalized' by the individual. The emphasis given to meaning 
and communication by Bernstein may also be seen in the context 
of 'learning theory' in education and the influence of 
developmental psychology in educational studies. This emphasis 
is reflected in Bernstein's explicit concern to see that the 
practices of schooling 'are refracted through an understanding 
of the culture the children bring to the school' (1971:152). 
A brief account will be glven of Parsons' account of culture in 
order to demonstrate the further conn:non features in the works of 
Parsons and Bernstein. 'Culture' in Parsons' theory is a 
'system of generalized symbols and their meanings' (1982:141). 
TI1is system of symbols is a social phenomenon and exists 
'externally' from individuals. 
The process of socialization depends upon indi vid..uals 
'internalizing' the system through the process of interaction 
with others. Parsons indicates that a 'stable, mutually 
oriented system of interaction' is dependent on a common culture 
whose basic function is to give particular 'sigrrificance' to 
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objects and other persons within the society. Thus a system of 
meaning existing prior to the interactions of individuals is the 
primary postulate of this theory. Parsons draws upon Durkheim's 
account of sentiments and stresses the importance of affect and 
motivation in the process of ascribing significance or meaning 
to the social and physical environment. 
In the interactions of persons connnon cultural 'significance' is 
generated and assigned to other persons and objects in the 
environment. The role of affect is to ascribe twhat the object 
means in an emotional sense' (1982:132). Affect is actualized 
through a process of 'cathexis' of other persons and objects. 
Through this process emotional 'meaning' is given to persons and 
objects in terms of attachment or aversion to them (1982:132). 
Through this process a cognitive reference system· is built up: 
The conditions of socialization of a person are such 
that the gratifications which derive from cathexis of 
objects cannot be secured unless, along with 
generalizations of emotional meanings and their 
conmrunication, he also develops a cognitive 
categorization of objects, including himself, and a 
system of moral norms which regulate the relations 
between himself and the object (a superego) (Parsons, 
1982:141). 
The developnent of norms takes place through the individual's 
integraLion of cognitive and cathectic meanings into a system 
(1982:132), with the result that: 
all the components 
internaljzed as pa.rt 
of 
of 
the 
the 
common culture are 
personality structure. 
In 
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Moral standards, indeed, carmot 1.n this respect be 
dissociated from the content of the orientation 
patterns wh.ich they regulate; ... the content of ooth 
catheclic-attitudes and cognitlve-status def.i.n.i.tions 
have cultural hence, normative significance. The 
content is cultural ancl learned (1982:134) [original 
emphasis]. 
describing the cultural shaping of personality and 
perception, Parsons stresses the role of language as 'a 
generalized medil.llll of connnunication through the use of symbols 
given meaning within a code' (1982:226). Bernstein shares this 
emphasis on language and its function. In 1965 in an article 
entitled A socio-linguistic approach to social learning 
Bernstein gave an account of 'code' which strongly reflects the 
Parsonian framework outlined above. 
Bernstein's account of codes implies an underlying prior 
'culture' or system of meanings which . l.S transmitted to 
individuals initially through family interactions in the form of 
roles (1971:122/3). This culture provides particular socially 
structured ways of 'relating to objects and persons' 
(1971:123). Bernstein, however, relativizes the basic elements 
of Parsons' system of meaning by suggesting that the elaborated. 
code gives emphasis to the cognitive over affective components 
of the system (and vice-versa for the restricted code). 6 
Bernstein's framework of analysis shares with Parsons' theory 
the notion of a 'general' and, one might add, 'total', system of 
meanings with dual aspects of cognitive reference and affect; 
this general system of meanings is 'realized through different 
6This maintains the basic distinction between affect and logic proposed 
in the earlier account of language forms. 
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role relations' {Bernstein, 1971: 150) and so 1.s generated by, 
and inseparable from, the concept of social structure. Through 
specif le speech inte:rdCtions wi thln U1e family the child 'learns 
specific coo.es whlch regulate his verbal acts' (1971:144): 
From thls point of view, every tlme the child speaks or 
l.istens, the social structure is reinforced. in him and 
his social identity shaped. The social structure 
becomes the child's psychological reality through the 
shaping of his acts of speech (1971:144). 
The sociological assumption underlying this forinulation is that 
of Parsonian 'role' which in Bernstein's terms is a: 
... constellation of shared learned meanings through 
which lndividuals are able to enter stable, consistent 
and publically recognized forms · of interaction with 
others. A social role can then be considered as a 
complex coding activity controlling both the 
creation and organization of speclfic meanings and the 
conditions for their transmission and receptlon 
(1971:144/5) [original emphasis]. 
These roles are 'learnt' through 'a process of commun.icatlon' 
(1971:144). 
The rationality implied by the concept of code is dependent upon 
a system of 'meanings' which 'inhere 1.n linguistic codes' 
(1971:164) and which shape, constrain and give form to specific 
'intellectual and social procedures' by wh.ich individuals relate 
themselves to their environment' (1971:135). At.. this s t.a.ge 
BernsLein attempts to weld both conceptualizations of ccxie - as 
a set of system of meanings and a set of procedures into the 
theory. Bernstein, however, recognizes an ambivalence wi·thin 
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the th~ory about 'meanings' and their significance. At a later 
s-Lage he is forced to assert that the 'organizing concepts' of a 
culture take precedence over 'any one set of meanings' 
( 1971: 164) . Codes then 
communication' (1971:181).7 
become 'the deep structure of 
Both notions of 'code' , however, 
carry the same vision of a conceptual or cognitive hierarchy 
suggested by the earlier concept of language forms. When 
construed as 'the principle which regulates the selection and 
organization of speech events' restricted and elaborated codes 
realize 'different social and intellectual orientat.ions and 
procedures' (1971:145). When construed as specific systems of 
communication involving 'coded meanings' restricted and 
elaborated codes are seen to realize orientations to 
particularistic and universalistic meanings respectively 
(1971:175).These terms are derived directly from Parsons 
(Bernstein, 1971:2). 
Elaborated Code as Transcendent Rationality 
As a general aspect of functional theory Parsons sees societies 
as evolving towards forms "based upon universalistic norms which 
genuinely recognize and extract the potential of individual 
abilities as part of a process of fulfilling 8ocial needs 
(1967: 326), Class societies are seen to be a stage of Lhls 
evolution and the differentiation of roles which they require 
parallels an 'attendant reduction of ascription' (1967:519) by 
which he means 'primitive kinship ascription' (1967:579). The 
7The notion of 1 deep structure' is a derivitive of Chomsky's generative 
grammar . It is significant that this line of linguistics stresses 
grammar as a limited set of principles of logic which shape speech 
events. 
-39-
move toward un.i.versal.i.st.i.cally or.i.ented value systems is seen 
to be a funct.i.onal requirement of modern soc.i.et ies that 
'counteract[s] the spread of hierarchical pallerns wi t h respec t 
to IXJWer beyond the range felt to be functionally necessary for 
effectiveness' (1967:326). This 'evolutionary' perspective in 
Parsons is also carried by the shared basic theoretical concepts 
of Bernstein's accolfilt of linguistic codes - with their emphasis 
upon communication within a given social structure. The outcome 
is that the concept of elaborated code expresses the idea of a 
transcendant 'rationality' (Bisseret 1979:96). 
Wh.i.le codes are seen to be generated in particular types of 
fcUnily contexts, the elaborated code as an 'organizing theme' 
can be detached from the context of its generation: 
Although an elaborated code does not entail any 
specific value system, the value system of the middle 
class penetrates the very texture of the learning 
context itself (1971:186) [emphasis added]. 
It is worth comparing this formulation with the earlier one in 
which formal language was seen to induce in users a 'theoretical 
attitude' 
organization 
facilitate 
towards the structural IXJssibilities of sentence 
(1971:61). 
the 'verbal 
There formal speech was seen to 
elaboration of subjective intent, 
sensitivity to the implications of separateness and difference' 
and to JX)int to 'possibilities inherent in a co~plex conceptual 
hierarchy for the organization of experience' (1971:61). The 
elaborated code, unlike the restricted code, lS 
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tcontext-independent' in that elements of context are made 
explicit. Nothing is taken for granted by the verbally 
speaker. In this sense .it is 'universalistic' 1n its 
orientation to meaning: 
Elaborated codes are less tied to a given or local 
structure and thus contain the potentiality of change 
in principles. In the case of elaborated codes the 
speech may be freed from its evoking social structure 
and it can take on an autonomy ... Where codes are 
elaborated, the socialized has more access to the 
grounds of his own socialization, and so can enter into 
a reflexive relationship to the order he has taken 
over. Where codes are restricted, the socialized has 
less access to the grounds of his socialization, and 
thus reflexiveness may be limited in range. One of the 
effects of the class system is to limit access to 
elaborated codes ( 19°71: i 76) [original emphasis]. 
In the same passage, Bernstein explicitly contrasts elaborated 
and restricted codes as focusing rationality and metaphor 
respectively (1971:176). It is important to note that the move 
towards rationality through the elaborated code is an absolute 
move. It involves, in Mary Douglas' terms, 'the idea of the 
self •.. progressively detached from the social structure' 
(Douglas, 1978:57). 
On the one hand, Bernstein suggests that while the working class 
has the same inherent potential as the middle class, its 
socializing practices and the social values on which they rest 
are inherently different from those of the middle class. This 
can be seen in the distinction between potential and developed 
intelligence in Bernstein's research (1971:66). Nevertheless, 
the type of social order which ls constructed by the working 
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class takes a lower place than the middle class order, on the 
conLinuum of tobjective' reason. The problem here is that Lhis 
idea of an absolute 'objective' reason carries with it the idea 
of an absolute individualism. Durkheim's account of organic 
solidarity was intended to counteract this notion of 
free-floating individualism .implied by Spencer and Tonnies. 
(Lukes, 1972:143) Organic solidarity was construed as truly 
social in essence (Durkheim, 1972:147). Bernstein's account of 
organic solidarity corresponds to middle class social cohesion 
(1971:147). The way in which Bernstein contrasts organic 
solidarity with working class mechanical solidarity involves an 
absolute corresponding contrast of rationality with authority 
(1971:165). This, in turn, involves a contrast between 
'persons' and 'objects' (1971:165). These contrasts heavily 
imply an idealized concept of 'person' and 'individual' in the 
very conceptual tenns in which they are made. While Bernstein 
does attempt to describe middle class practices in social terms, 
a notion of idealized individualism is what emerges.a 
Bernstein's Account of Class 
A ma.Jar limitation of Bernstein's analysis ls his formal and 
essentially structuralist account of cla8s. While the idea of a 
class-divided social structure is central to Bernstein's 
analysi:::;, the theory does not contain an explicit account of the 
concept of class. Bernstein's mcxie of social theorizing in 
aourkheim's insistence on the need for rationalist in complex societies 
is not accompanied by a lessening of the need for a moral order or a 
lessening of 1 sentiment 1 • The type of moral order and attendant 
sentiments will, however, be very different from earlier forms 
(1971:217). Bernstein's conceptual contrasts imply the absolute 
contrast of logic and affect (Bernstein, 1971:46). 
-42-
general tends to focus upon dualisms - working class/middle 
class; mechanical solidarity/organic sol.i.clarity; restricted 
ccxie/elaborated code; particularistic meanings/universalist ic 
mean.iri.gs, etc. The irnportanL feature of this type of theor .iz.ing 
.1s that Lhe analysis sets up dualisms as formal entitles and 
works from that point. 9 The dualisms outlined in the theory 
may be construed as 'oppositions' in that the internal logical 
order which each part of the dualism expresses, reflects a form 
which can be logically opposed to the other. (IL is worth 
noting . in this context that having outlined the features of 
formal social language, Bernstein notes that the characteristics 
specified are 'relative to those of a public language' 
(1971:56)). Social solidarity exists therefore in mechanical 
and organic fonus and the internal structure of mechanical forms 
is presented in formal contrast to' the .internal structure of 
organic fonns. 
Bernstein's analysis is premised on the inherent internal 
'rationality' of the working class vouchsafed by the principles 
of social organization on which it rests and which it 
practises. However, while these principles are different from 
the principles of social organization of the middle class, the 
theory sets up an absolute contrast on a scale of objective 
reason. 
This mcxie of analysis construes classes as formally dichotomous 
oppositions. They are in essence different 'forms' of society 
9This mode of theorizing from formal dijalisms is also a characteristic of 
Durkheim (Lukes, 1972:20-21) and it would seem that Bernstein 1 s 
analytical approach is highly derivative of it. This reflects the lack 
of analytical sophistication in relation to class in educational 
sociology (Demaine, 1981:31 ). 
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expresslng different fonns of social solidarity. TI1ls is the 
cause of a ma.Jar gap in Berns teln' s theory. The concept of 
'social sLruct..ure' in the theory refers Lo modes of solidarity 
of separate and discrete classes (Bisseret, 1979:109). 
Bernstein explic.ity states that Lhe two codes 'are likely lo be 
a realization of different social struetures' (1971:146) 
[emphasis added]. 
This static account of class has no relation to Marxist accounts 
which see the constitution of class in terms of relations of 
production and the alteration of class relations through the 
dynamic of struggle. Bernstein admits the limitations to his 
theory in accounting for change (1971:172) and proposes a 
solution to this problem by harnessing to his account a Marxist 
perspective on social structure. This problem of accounting for 
change in social systems is widely recognized in sociological 
and anthropological theory. 
states U1at: 
Asad (1979) (following Bloch) 
the concept of social structure in anthropology refers 
to an integrated totality of social classifications and 
meanings, a system of social rules and roles •... Now, if 
this concept of social structure is llnked to the 
doctrine of the social origin of concepts (the social 
determination of cognition) it becomes impossible to 
specify how social change can occur (1979:611). 
Bernstein attempts to address this problem by suggesting that 
the concept of social structure is to be perceived as embodying 
power relations: 
The key is given in tenns of the social significance of 
a society's productive system and the power 
As 
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relationships to which the productive system gives 
rise. Further access to, control over, orientation of 
and change in critical symbolic systems, according to 
the theory, is governed by power relationships as these 
are embodied in the class structure (Bernstein, 
1971:172). 
his theory develops, Bernstein's voice takes on a 
strengthening Marxist tone by stressing the nature of codes as 
'positioning devices' by which the ideology of domination is 
constituted (1982 : 305) . . - - While the theory moves Lowards an 
explicit articulation of language as discourse - as a realm of 
contestation and of codes as sites of regulation of legitimate 
meanings (1982:307) and of dominant and dominated forms of 
communication (1982:305) the fonnal nature of the ideal 
oppositions within the theory prevails • . 
The social structure conceived as already embodying power 
relations, in the first instance, generates and determines the 
linguistic forms. In essence, this move expands the concept of 
social structure from the structure of discrete classes to a 
structure which contains discrete classes. While Bernstein 
emphasizes the notion of change in the social structure giving 
rise to changes in 'a given culture', no account is offered of 
how changes in the social structure emerge - or what causes 
them. The picture presented, then, is one of a closed fonnal 
system constituted by structural oppositions in an 'objective' 
and stratified social structure. It is this reference to a 
formal social structure having an existence independent of the 
interactions of individuals, and which subsequently structures 
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and shapes subjective identity, wh.i.ch lim.iLs Lhe Lheory's 
capacity for explanation. The problem is one of aL LempL.i.rig to 
l.i.nk soc.iolog.i.es of a very different basis - Marxist Lheory with 
its focus on social action and power and a basically Durkheimian 
sociology with its focus upon social cohesion through 
'collective representation' in language. 
This suggested reformulation and expansion of the concept of 
social structure to open up the theory - so that it can now take 
into account the asynunetrical nature of class relations - 1s 
superficial. 
rest upon 
My argument is that the key concepts of the theory 
the notion of communication contained within a 
singular system. The emphasis in the later theory of codes 1s 
concerned with ideology as 'distinctive fonns of communication' 
(1982:304) relative to class. This formulatlon stresses the 
structuring of meanlng w.i.th.i.n systems based upon class. 
Comparisons uan be made between such systems but an adequate 
account of how one system dam.in.ates another cannot be given. 
In the analysis above I have attempted to show the limitations 
of Bernstein's theory in accounting for class factors. These 
limitat.i.ons can be traced to its essentially Pa.rsonian framework 
and it is significant that Pa.rsons' later formulations refer to 
'the social system' (1982:129) rather than 'social structure'. 
Conmunication and Power 
As already indicated, Bernstein's account of the unequal 
educaLional achievement of different classes em.bodies a number 
-46-
of basic concerns of British sociology of e<lucat.ion. The 
central ideas are those of social structure, 'culture' as a 
unifying system of meaning wh.ich gives stabil.ity to soclal 
struture, and rationality. Within th.is ordering, emphasis is 
given to language as a socially learned sys tern of cormnunica tion 
whose use both expresses and, in turn, reinforces the underlying 
social structure. 
The analysis offers a partial break from structural-
functionalist accounts of education 1n that it does not stress 
the unified functioning whole of the system. But the break 
which it offers is theoretically incomplete. 
As I have shown the emphasis throughout Bernstein's theory is 
upon the notions of fonns of cormnunicatlon and their regulative 
functions. Where the analysis starts to deal explicitly with 
the question of power it is in the form of strucLural relations 
and procedures of control set up as 'distinctive modes of 
communication' (1982:304). So the starting point for the theory 
is still 'social structure' which embodies an already existing 
distribution of power and culture as a realm which generates 
distinctive classiflcatory principles. The concept of culture 
also retains the notion of differential modes of rationality 
embodied in different 'modalities of culture' generated 'by the 
specific form of social division of labour' (1982:319). 
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The innovations which Bernstein makes in his later work retain 
the basic idea of differential 'rationalities' expressed in 
cultural forms: 
This 
Every culture specializes principles [sic] for the 
creation of a specific reality through its distinctive 
classificatory principles and in doing so, necessarily 
constructs a set of procedures, practices and relations 
from a range of such sets. As a consequence each 
modality can be regarded as an arbitrary angling of a 
potential reality. There may well be features in 
common to the modalities of culture which have their 
source in the general features of the cultural subject 
(1982:319). 
is merely a superficial reworking of tlie idea of 
distinctive cultures associated with classes and the real 
problem which Bernstein raised much earlier is left open, that 
is, the question of power through unequal access to a conman 
culture, and 'whether there are features of the common culture 
which all members of the society share which are determined by 
the specific nature of the general code ... '(1971:123) [original 
emphasis]. 
The problem which is not resolved by Bernstein's analysis is tlie 
problem of power and its relationship to class. In Bernstein's 
analysis the notions of class, social organization and culture 
remain locked together. The idea of class culture, and 
specifically working class culture, envisaged as a distinctive 
and autonomous rationality, or 'angling of potential reality', 
has been a major .impediment in the sociology of education. The 
not.ion of 'cultural logic' specific to classes has come to 
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bedevil later analyses such as the work of Paul Willis, whose 
explic.il concerns are to give an account of change through an 
analysis of working class culture. 
Bernstein's analysis has, however, maintained a focus on a key 
aspect of education that has been neglected by many later 
analyses. The processes of education 1.11 complex societies 
require socialization into certain specific though not 
immutable sets of discourse and modes of action; that 
education by its very nature requires a directing and shaping of 
experience in particular ways. As indicated already, this 
forinulation reflects a Durkheimian corrmitment to 'rationalist 
education' based upon the academic disciplines (Durkheim, 
1972:217). 
In attempting to solve the problems of educational failure of 
working class students, Bernstein invokes a conservative 
sociology that stresses the functional interrelation of social 
structure and speech 
communication organize 
.identity. The not.ion 
forms which through a process of 
specific meanings and so shape social 
of power that the theory offers lies in 
the conception of different, autonomous and independent strata 
which have different codes of commlll1ication, different 
orientations to meaning and different realizations of social 
identity. The school is the place where these differences meet 
up - and the inferior one is selected out. 
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The theory, with its underlying conservative sociology, 
emphasizes the shaping of tpsychological reality' and social 
idenL.i ty . tSpeech 1.s envisaged as a process of communication 
not only beLween individuals but also in reference to the social 
structure which becomes the individual's "psychological 
reality"' (1971:144). Bourd.i.eu and Passeron (1977) make a 
number of significant criticisms of Bernstein's account of 
language. They indicate that, in the account of the differences 
between f ormc:1.l and public language, Bernstein reduces: 
to intrinsic characteristics of the language such as 
degree of syntactic complexity differences whose 
unifying generative principle lies in different types 
of relation to language themselves embedded in 
different systems of attitudes towards the world and 
other people ( 1977: 133 n.16). 
Now Bernstein does suggest that the characteristics of language 
are generated in different attitudes towards the world and other 
people and that these 'attitudes' are latently expressed in the 
modes of solidarity of respective classes. However, even with 
the link to social structure through code the basic idea of 
language determining cognition is maintained. 
There is a crucial difference in the respective views of class 
reality of Bourdieu and Pa.sseron on the one hand and Bernstein 
on the other. Bourdieu and Passeron do not deny the 
structuration of language along class divisions.10 What they 
suggest, however, is that such structured forms are generated in 
a relation of power between classes. The language of the 
lOAs a specific example Bourdieu and Passeron suggest that the language of 
the lower middle classes exhibits hyper-correctness and proliferation of 
signs of grammatical control which are indications of an attitude 
'characterized by anxious reference to the legitimate norm of academic 
correctness' (1977:133/4 n.16). 
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working class lS not an autonomous form reflecting an 
out-moded form of social organization given by a pre-existing 
soclal structure. It is a tdominated' fo11n. The ba.8.ic failure 
of Bernstein's account of language, they suggest, lies .1n 
seeklng in the language ilself Lhe delermining principle of 
speakers' attitudes 'in short, in taking the linguistic prcxiuct 
for the production of the attitudes that produce it' (1977:133 
n.16). This is a criticism of the Whorfian element of 
Bernstein's theory which overlays the Durkheimlan and Parsonian 
sociology, i.e. the consistent Whorfian preoccupation ill 
Bernstein's analysis precludes a proper sociological analysis of 
language and class and reduces language use to questions of 
percept.ion, cognition and communication. 
Bourdieu (1977) offers a general critique of the asstm1ptions 
underlying sociolinguistic analysis and suggests that: 
The structure of the linguistic production relation 
depends on the symbolic power relation between the two 
speakers, i.e. on the size of their respective capitals 
of authority (which is not reducible to specifically 
linguistic capital) (1977: 648). 
Bourdieu indicates that a proper sociological critique displaces 
the key concepts of politically neutral linguistic analysis. 
Bourdleu's criticisms are relevant to Bernstein's analysis which 
places considerable weight on the 'fa.rm.al' or socially 
legitimate aspects of formal language. 
Bourdieu suggests that the notion of legitimate language must 
replace the linguistic notion of 'correctness'; Lhat relations 
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of symbolic power must replace the notion of relalions of 
communication (or symbolic interaction) and that the question of 
meaning of speech should be replaced by the quest.ion of Lhe 
value and power of speech ( 1977: 646). In contrast with t he 
formal account of language use given by Berru;Lein, Bourdieu 
argues that: 
Language is a praxis: it is made for saying i.e. for 
use in strategies which are invested with all possible 
functions and not only communication functions. It is 
made to be SJX)ken appropriately (1977:646) [original 
emphasis]. 
Now the notion of 'approporiateness', of saying the right thing 
in the right place, is not a matter of recognizing an invariable 
meaning 'but of gr-d.Sping the singularity of form which only 
exists in a particular context' (Bourdieu, 1977:647). 
The fact that singularity of fonn only exists in a particular 
context is due to an exercise of power through whlch certain 
forms are legitimated (in reference to an authorized language). 
Bourdieu then regards speech interaction as embodying and 
realizing relations of power. 
'communi.cation': 11 He comments: 
They do not simply realize 
... the l.ir.iguist regards the conditions for the establislunent 
of conununication as already secw·ed, whereas, 1.n real 
situations, that is the essential question. He takes for 
granted the crucial point that people talk and talk to each 
other, are "on speaking tenns", that those who speak regard 
those who listen as worthy to listen and those who listen 
regard those who speak as worthy to speak (Bourdieu 
1977: 648) C.ori gi na 1 emphas i 0 . 
llBernstein has had a continuing dialogue with Bourdieu on such issues and 
his later theory reflects a partial acknowledgement of Bourdieu ls 
criticisms. This can be seen in the emphasis in the later theory 
(1982) upon codes as 'dominated and doiinating forms of communication' 
(1 982: 305). 
-52-
In contrast to Lh.i.s view of language as praxis, Bernstein's 
view of language ~mphasi~es the process of shaping of identily 
whereby Lhe child .is ultimately conducting a dialogue w.iLh the 
given social 8tructure (of its class). 
The perspeeLive of power only comes w.iLh the placing of the 
child lil the conlext of education. In envisaging socialization 
into tmeaning' the theory neglects the role of power wilhin 
class formations. The picture is of parents benevolently 
shaping and constraining, and thtIB giving fonn to lhe child's 
emerging social identity. 1 2 Thus Bernstein's account of 
language is extremely strucluralist and does not contain any 
significant notion of praxis of language as an element of 
social action employed by agents for specific purposes .1n 
historical contexts of social action. In Bowtlieu's terms, the 
Lheory reduces Lhe questions of value, power and auLhorizaLlon 
of language to matlers of meaning and communication. 
Bourdieu's account gives weight to the inlractability of 
historically created structures but it is important to note that 
there is no-thing tessential' about such structures. Their 
intractability emerges from the fact that they are not, as a 
matter of course, challenged by agents. 
In Bernstein's analysis class reproduction through education, 
then, is a matter of communicative dissonance rather than 
actualization of power. Bernstein does not given a detailed 
12one glaring o~mission is the construction of gender within the family 
which is a relation of power largely realized in speech interaction. 
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account of what happens in interactions between teachers and 
students. The analys.is, wiLh the pr.unary focus on differential 
codes, pas.its the format.ion of classes as the formation of 
particular social identities within discrete and closed systems. 
Bernstein's theory of ccxies attempts to offer a systematic 
explanation of the shaping of the reality of subjects through a 
prevailing syslem. In assuming a P.d.rsoni.an framework, his 
account of the workings of culture issues in a realization of 
'Lhe social system' and a formation of a particular social 
identity through the inter'd.Ctions of individual subjects. The 
idea of code focused as it is upon meaning - contains the 
notion of a compulsory mode of rationality which all 
participants 1.n a culture come to acquire. The interactions of 
individuals are in no way free but must develop 1.n certain 
directions dictated by the underlying principle of social 
cohesion and ordering of the social structure. 
The main limitations of Bernstein's sociology consist in: 
the idealized notion of conununicalion which ls generated 
(through codes) by an underlying social logic of discrete 
classes; 
the inert conceptualization of roles as 'given' social 
mear1lngs external lo individuals which are learnt by them; 
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Lhe preclusion of an account of power Lhrough lnLeracLions 
be Lween and wi U1ln cla.88es; 
the formal and slructurallst account of class ilself; 
the idea of an emerging and transcendent trationality' whieh 
corresponds to an emerging universal 'social structure'; 
the generality of the account of 'language patterns' as 
collective representations. 
Further limi Lations of the 
inconsislencies wllhin U1e 
analysis are 
theory itself, 
created 
namely, 
by 
the 
ambiguities in the following concepts: 
rationality which occurs in both an 'objective' sense as an 
evolutionary ideal and as a scheme of meanings and 
procedures specific to a social structure; 
the suggestions of an a-social individualism which 
accompanies the account of organic solidarity and elaborated 
code; 
'code' which is both a system of meanings and a set of 
logical procedures. 
Overall, there are two general limitations which apply to 
Bernstein's analysis. Firstly, the functionalist emphasis upon 
-55-
mean.ing (whether construed as logical procedures or systems of 
meanings) cannot be adequately linked to any dialectical notion 
of class and its orientation in education. The theory cannot 
account for change and .is left with the relaL.ively inert idea of 
communicative dissonance between the school and working clci!:is 
students. Secondly, the terms of Bernstein's analysis are open 
Lo Lhe criticism Lhat they imply an .ideal.ized view of 'the 
rational individual', free from social constraint. 
Bernstein's theory suggests not only an evolving 'rdt.ionality' 
buL also an emerging universal social structure. This 
suggestion is not explicit, but is reflected in the general 
absence of a critique of middle class practice and the idealized 
account of schooling and education. In his own terms, 'schools 
are predicated upon elaborated code and its system of social 
relationships' (1971:186). It may be that the Durkheimian ideal 
of equitable education based upon rationalist principles has led 
Bernstein to idealize the existing practices of education. The 
'forms of thought' on which education is based are seen to 
embody in ideal for,ns 'universalistic meanings': 
In 
The introduction of the child to the universalistic 
meanings of public forms of thought is not compensatory 
education. It is education. It is not in itself 
making Lhe child middle class ( 1971: 199) [original 
emphasis]. 
its basic stance, Bernstein's sociology of education 
ma.intains a very unromant.ic view of working class 'culture'. 
The working class, in Bernstein's view, must be given access to 
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forms of thought which will open up possibilities for it. In 
Lhls Bernstein 's analysis slands in contrast to later analyses 
whlch suggest that worklng class culture contains in itself the 
potential for liberation. 
Overall, Bernstein's basic conceptual framework remains 
structural-functionalist. 
What I will be arguing in the next chapter is that similar 
basic elements of structural-functionallst social theory occur 
in the later analysis of education conducted by the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. And that these analyses exhibit 
limitations very similar to those which occur in Bernstein's 
social theory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PAUL WILLIS: CULTURAL STUDIES -
A THEORY OF WORKING CLASS CULTURE 
AND RESISTANCE 
The second major body of work to be considered in this thesis is 
Lhe 'cultural studies' movemenL associated with the Centre for 
Contemporary 
Birmin.ghanf. 
Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the Univers.ity of 
The primary focus in this body of material is the 
work of Paul Willis (1977) and (1983) who focused attention upon 
the idea of 'counter school culture' in the field of education. 
IntroducLion 
At first glance, the mode of analysis whi.ch Willis embarks on is 
very different from that of Bernste.in. However, the 
similarities in the basic elements of the conceptual framework, 
and the ensuing problems which both analyses share, far outweigh 
the differences. 
Willis,in contrast with Bernstein, gives an 'applied' theory. 
The concepts used are couched in the terminology of Marxist 
discourse. These include the concept of ideology and each of 
the following terms whlch, ln Lurn, become paired with 'class': 
struclure, opposition, struggle, resistance, coil8ciousness and 
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cul Lure. This Marxist terminology, however, is merely a surface 
and I intend to show that the theory proposed by Willis reflects 
a trad.i.l.ional sociological framework whose lx:tsic concept is 
cul Lure, which func lions 1.n rela Lion Lo ar1 underly .i.ng soc.i.al 
structure, and whose prJ.mary social function .ts to enforce 
social cohesion in the group. Central Lo th.is formulation ls 
lhe .idea of culture as a system of 'meanings' and 'principles' 
which expresses group values and commun.i.cales Lhem to members of 
the group. Culture is thus a creator of social .identity. This 
framework, however, 1.s masked by the terms of Marxist discourse 
in which it is expressed. 
An initial comparison of the two bodies of work indicates an 
apparent movement in studies of education away from the fonnal 
systematic and impersonal ac..,--count provided by Bernstein and 
towards an emphasis on ~ change agency, voll tion and intent wl Lh 
the purpose of depicting change (Willis, 197]: 1-2). As 
indicated, this reflects a current general trend of social 
theory. 1 Willis' study draws upon the American trd.Ciitlon of 
interpretive ethnographic enquiry (Marcus, 1986:178). However, 
I intend to show the explicit conceptual apparatus informing the 
work shows strong Durkheimian elements which are more directly 
at tri bu table to the traditions of educational sociology 
practised in Britain. The basic premise contained in Willis' 
analysis is that the colleetivity is greater than the sum of its 
individual parts. I intend to show that Lhe outcome of this 
lA spec ific example of this trend is the current dissaffection with the 
concept of 1 role 1 • Connell (1987 ) states: 1 •• .role theory is not a 
social theory at all. It comes 'right' up to the problem where social 
theory logically begins, the relationship between personal agency and 
soci al structure; but evades it by dissolving structure into agency' 
(1987:50). 
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prem1-se .1s thaL the concept of 'cultural logic' in Willis' 
8Ludy is no less compulsory and deternrin.ing for work.ing class 
sLudenLs Lhan Berns te.in' s concepL of 'cc.xie' . The ba..8ic 
quest.ions, therefore, are: does Willis give a convincing 
description of how agents transform structures, and what 
slruc Lures do Lhey Lransf onn? My analysis will focus the answer 
which Willis gives to these questions. 
A general comparison of the key concepts of Bernstein and Willis 
.indicates a shift from an emphasis upon language to an emphasis 
upon social practices described as 'behavioural, visual and 
stylistic forms of expression' (Willis, 1977': 124). Th.is very 
shift, however, maintains the basic proposition contained in 
Bernstein's analysis - that working class subjects 'resist' the 
f or,nal conventions of language authorized by the processes of 
schooling. The terms of this resistance, however, are quite 
different in the two analyses. Bernstein views the authorized 
language as in itself resistant to the social processes of the 
working class. Faria.al language resists working class subje<..:ts 
Will.is suggesLs that Lhe very resistance to like a wall. 
authorized language contains an active intentional component: 
Part of lhe reaction to the school institution is ... a 
reject.ion of words and considered la.nguage as the 
express.ion of men Lal llfe ( 1977: 124) [emphci.8.is added]. 
Res.i.stance Lo auLhori!led language is thus perceived as an aet.ive 
and 'anLagonisL.ic ... express.ion' towards given conventions 
( 1977: 124) . Its outcome is an active turning away on the part 
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of working c..:la.8s subjecLs from l anguage il!:>elf Lo br oader 
tbehav iourdl ... fo.rm8 of express.ion' ( 1977: 124 ) . 
Cullurdl Studies- in F.ducaLion 
A brief overview will now be given of the assumpt ions and 
meLhodology of the tc..:ultural sludies' approach. Here I wi l l 
also outline the sociological context of 'reproduction t heory' 
in which it arose. 
Learning to Labour (Willis: 1977) has become something of a 'set 
piece' not only wiLhin studles of edueaLlon buL w.ilh.in sociology 
and anthropology more generally. Marcus (1986) notes Lhat the 
work has particular relevance to anthropologl<..:al method and 
theory because of its attempt to work from m.i.cro-ethnogrdphy to 
broader analytical theory. He offers an account of iLs 
consLruction of text and questions the way in which it invokes 
Marxist theory to link micro observations to ma.era 
perspectives. He indicates .its importance as an ethnography 
conducted within complex industrial society and suggests that 
the principal alfil of the analysis is to redefine capitalist 
structure 'in human terms' (1986:178). The process which Willis 
employs is a close probing of the experiences of a.gents who 
respond to 'instilutionally enacted capitalist principles ... in 
their everyday life and experience' (Marcus, 1986:178). 
Th.is sLudy which emerged as part of a more gene.rdl movemenL of 
'cultural studies' emanating from the Centre for Contemporary 
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Cultural Studies. Other influential CCCS works .include 
ResisLance through R.iLuals (1976), Women Take Issue (1978) and 
Working Class CulLure (1979) and the other work of Paul Will.is 
Profane Culture (1978). In all these analyses the focus .is on 
sub-cultures, LhaL is, distinctive 'w-dys of llfe' of disLincL 
groups (Hall and Jefferson 1976:10). 
CCCS method of a social analysis ha.8 had a fXJWerful impact on 
studies of education and ways of tackling Lhe problem of Lhe 
consistent failure of working class students in studies .in 
Britain, the United Stales and Austrdl.ia . . (Calls for similar 
approaches (with certain modifications) have come from major 
figures wiLhin education studies, particularly in the United 
Slates (Apple, 1982, Aronwitz and Giroux, 1985). These analysts 
call for Lhe development of a 'rad.ical pedagogy' wh.ich 
recogni~es and utilizes key aspects of student experience, seen 
to take the form of collective opposition or resistance to 
dorninan t cultural farms J. 
The 'cultural studies' approach employed in these works 
attempted to change the tradlti.onal arguments about culture and 
worklng class education. Instead of being portrayed as 
purveyors of 'good culture', schools came to be viewed as siLes 
of 'cultural' struggle between . various groups - all of whom 
possessed a d.ist.inctive 'culLure' (Connell, 1983:223). 
Learning to Lal>our marks Lhe first ma.Jor inLroduction of the 
no Li.on of sub-culture .into educaLlon studies. In using 
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'parllcipanl observation' of a part.lcular small-scale group 8.8 
iLs basis for analytical description the work draws upon an 
American Lraclilion of social analysis firsL employed in Lhe 
19208. Th.i::, Lraclition emerged from the sLudy of streeL gang!:::i in 
Chicago in Lhe 1920s by criminologists (Helx:lige, 1979:76). 
Hehl.ige notes that this tradition of description, while it 
provided interesLln.g and evoea.Llve accoLU1ts of subeulLure was 
marked by an absence of sat.isfactory analytical frameworks, and 
so had marginal staLus in the Lrad.iLion of mainsLrecUn sociology 
(1979:76-7). He also indicates that the lack of such analyLical 
frameworks in U1ese studies mean L they neg lee Led cla8s and fX)Wer 
relat.ioru:; wiLhin them: 
In such accounts, the subculture 
presenLed as an independent organism 
outside the larger social, political 
contexts (Hehiige 1979:76). 
tends to be 
functioning 
and economic 
The CCCS movement has attempted lo fill this analytical gap in 
the study of subcultures by linking structural neo-Marxist 
Lheories of class Lo ethnographic description (Connell, 
1983: 224). Subcultures are seen to exisl in a relationship to 
twider class-cultural networks of wh.ich they are a distinctive 
pa.rt' (Hall and Jefferson, 1976:13). CCCS stud.ies, Lhen, 
diverge from tradltional anthropolog.ical aecounts of culLure .in 
that cultural forms are seen to be forged ln class conflicL. 
Cul lur-dl forms 8.8 presented in CCCS s tud.ies appear not.. Lo be su.i 
generis {MarclIB, 1986: 178) . 2 I lnlend to show thaL U1ls ls 
2Willis in fact contradicts this account by calling for a theory of class 
culture sui generis (1977:139, n.4). 
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8Uperflclal and LhaL Lhe concepL of culLure cunLalned .in Lhese 
analyses cannuL be anyLhing but culture su.i generis. What I 
.inLend Lu show J.8 LhaL CCCS meLhodology sLarLs from a v.iew of 
sc.x..:.ial sLrucLw·e wh.ich cannoL be d.is L.irigu.ishe<l in any 
s.igniflcant way from Lhal which <X.,'Curs ln Bernstein's laler 
fonnulalions, nGilllely a concepL of a social structure which 
embraces opposed classes and which, 1.n the first .instance, 
embodi.es a d.istribution of power relations. Using Willis as a 
specific example, I wlll .indicate that this meLhodology contains 
serious unresolved problems in the way in which the concepts of 
culture and class are linked. 
Cultural studies as a response to theories of social 
reproduction 
Willis' analysis stands, along with other CCCS studies, as a 
parL.ial reaclion to theories of 'social reproduction' which 
stemmed lniLlally from the structuralist neo-Marxlst theory of 
Lou.is Althus::,er in the 1970s. Major examples of Lhls approach 
include Lefebvre's The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of 
the RelaLlons of ProducLlon (1976) .in France, and Bowles and 
Gintis' Schooling in Capitalist America (1976). (It is noted 
that a pr.1Il1B.ry concern wlth the concept of reproduct.ion 1.s found 
within social theories of both structuralist and 'prcLxls' 
persuasions. Bourdieu and °P'd.Sseron' s Reproduction in Education, 
Soe.ieLy and CulLure (1977) is an example of the latter.) 
Reeurren t er l tlcism.s of reproduc Lion Lheory emerging from the 
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analyses of Connell (1980, 1983), Apple (1982), Aronowil~ and 
Giroux (1985) and Willis (1977, 1983) concern its excessively 
's Lruc Luralis l' and a-historical nature and its consequent 
neglect of individual agency. These wriLers also objecL to the 
emphasis upon abstract theory at the expense of a grounding in 
specific ins Lances. In Connell' s ter,ns these theories of social 
reproduction have shown a 'persistent lack of realism' (1980:46) 
and have consequently presented the concept of reproduction as a 
'black box' J ( 1980 : 44 ) an implied theoretical mechanism 
required by the theory to explain how certain specific effects 
are achieved. Furthermore, such theories had a strong 
'functional' flavour - the purpose of schools being seen as the 
reproduction of social cla8s (through reproduction of relations 
of producL.i.on). 
The problem of accounting for change 
It is .important to note that these criticisms, as they appear .in 
educaL.i.onal analysis are not made simply on the basis of the 
need for pure theory. Education, being an 'applied field' 
requ1.res practical outcomes. Calls for a 'radical pedagogy' or 
'liberating pra.ctice' are therefore highly significant. Such a 
practice 1.8 perceived to require accounts of agency or praxis 
which theories of social reproduction lack. That ls, human 
beings must be seen Lo be able to change at least in small way8 
Lhe circumsLances which confronL them. Willis is acuLely aware 
of th.is .1s8ue and presenLs his analy8.i.s a8 a prd.{;tical .inquiry 
lConnell 1 s criticisms of Bou rd ieu seem to indicate a misunderstanding of 
Bourdieu's concepts of 'practice' dnd 'habitus ' . Connell 1 s own 
formulatioffiof praxis reflect a strong concurrence with Bourdieu 1 s 
pr1~ary theoret1cdl concern . 
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directed towards an outline of <What to do on Monday morning', 
the theme of the final chapter of Learning to Labour. That .1s, 
analysis must have a practical application in classrooms. 
Connell's criticisms of reproduction theory also reflecL the 
more general w.ssaL.isfactlon lr1 soclologleal analysis ( referred 
to above) with the comprehensive, abstract and impersonal vision 
prov lded by s Lruc turalis L U1eories which elide U1e sl!;U1if lcance 
of agents doing Lhings 1.n favour of depicting structured 
regularities of sysLem. 
AL Lheir most basic level theories of reproduction are concerned 
with 'cha.r-acterisLlcs of classes and the pa.tLerns of relations 
between them' (Connell, 1980:39). While analysing reproduction 
these theories have, according to Coru1ell, 'taken the nature and 
the pattern of these relations for gr--d.Ilted' ( 1980:39). Connell 
objects to Lhe 'givenness' of class which reproduction theory 
requ.1res and insists that it is necessary to break wilh this 
account: 
The "reproduction of social relations" is a chimera: in 
all structures it never occurs; l t cannot oc~ur. We 
cannot treat social structure as something persisting 
1.n its identity behind the backs of mortal people, who 
are inserted into ·Lheir places by a cosmic cannery 
called Reproduction (1980:42). 
He sees social structure as the result of 'real practices,' as 
< ... things done by knowing people as they respond to situations 
that ar1.se from Lhem in a world of power' (1980:42). In brief, 
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Connell perce.1ve8 Lhe need Lu challenge the .idea of ' t he 
onLolog.ical sLructure of reproduced identity' (1980:42 ) 
[ur.ig.in.al empha.sis] germane to reproduction theory. 
W.illls also reacts to Lhe determ..in.ism of reproduction theory 
(1977:2). By focusing upon these elemenLs of agency Willis 
suggests that it l>ecomes possible to see Lransforinations of 
structure which people are constantly making, and furthermore 
how Lhey are 'bringing the whole system into er.is.is' (1977:1). 
However, raLher than validatir,.g Lhe supposed transf ormalions and 
<..J1alleriges Lo 'dominant cul Lure' by 'workln.g class 
culture', Will.i8' sLud.y, overall, presents a picture of 
.incorporallon of the focal group .inLo Lhe dominated structure of 
manual labour, or, to use Will.is' term, their 'entrapment' 
( 1977: 120). This element of function.al.ism will be considered 
shortly .1n clo8e de tail . 4 Will.is thUB maintains, albeit 
unintentionally, a 'reproductive' 8tance. 
'class identity' 
He indicates that 
... is not truly reproduced until it has properly passed 
through the individual and the group, until it has been 
recreated in the context of what appears to be personal 
and collective volition (1977:2). 
The notion of 'class identity' and its recreation through social 
processes .1s a key concept .1n Willis' analysis. My argument 
will be that this "basic concept cannot be distinguished in any 
significant way from the idea of social .identiLy fanned by 
pruces8es in relation to a pre-given social 8Lructure of 
~It is noted that 1 entrapment' is not a chance outcome but an unavoidable 
conclusion emanating fro~ the terms of the analysis which is thus 
strongly 1 functional' in its principal elements. 
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tradlLlonal coll::lervative sociology. I wlll argue further Lhat 
Lhe CCCS emphasl8 upon agency 18 a superflclal modifleallon of 
reproduction theory and that consequently the studles 
unwittingly set up volition (of agenls ) and deLenu.inaLlon (by 
structures) as polarities which cannot be reconc.;lled. 
The AlLhusserlan legacy .1n cultural stud.ies .1s not merely 
reflected in Lhe structuralist account of class - but, perhaps 
more imporLanLly, .1n the ldea of elass cullure. This emerges in 
doctrine of the coherence of a particular body of 
'knowledge' held by particular classes (West, 1984:261). 
Connell also notes that this Lendenc.;y to poslt a total 
conception of culture (for the group in question) .is comI-XJunded 
by the 'ethnogra.phic tr-d.Clition' (1983:224) which assumes that 
groups a.re built upon coherent and specific structures of 
mean.i.ng. 
These issues are noted generally al thls sU::Lge and I wlll 
con8.ider th.em : in relation lo the 8pecific.; linkages which Wlllls 
makes between class and cul tw·e. 
The reliance on ethnogra.PlY 
An account will now be given of the prineipal meLhodological 
steps employed by Will.is. It is important to note that Willis' 
very melhodology carries key presumptions about the concept of 
culture and my intention here is to delineate these. 
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In =Le=a=r..::..n=.i=r~i,g..___L.;:_o~_L=a.;:_· Lo....;.._;;_..::..ur=- the pr.unary mode of analysis is 
eLhnograph.ic. 
ELhnography and 
The 
Lhe 
firsL half of the work 1.s ent.i.Lled 
second half Analys.i.s . The m1.cro-
sociological ol>servat.i.ons of the first half are situated wi Lhl!l 
a broader, more explicit t heory of cul Lu.re and class .in U1e 
second half. 
W.ill.is expla.ins his emphasis on 'ethnography' in the following 
le.nns: 
The qualitative methcxb, and ~drticipation Observation 
used .in Lhe r~search and the ethnograph.ic format of Lhe 
presentation were dictated by the nature of my .interest 
in < the cul Lur-dl . ' These technlques are su.i Led to 
record th.is level and have a seilliitivity to meanings 
and values as well as an ability to represent and 
interpret symbolic articulations, practices and for,ns 
of cultural production. In particular the ethnographlc 
account, without always kr1ow.ing how, can allow a degree 
of the activity, creativity and human agency within the 
object of the study to come through into ·the ana.J..ysis 
and reader's experience. This ls vital to my purposes 
where I view Lhe cultural, not simply as a set of 
Lransferred internal structures (as in the usual 
not.ions of sociali~ation) nor as the passive result of 
lhe action of dom.i.nant .ideology downward.B (as in 
cerla.in kinds of Marxism) but at lea.8L in part as the 
product of collecLive human praxis (1977:3-4) [emphas.is 
added]. 
The emphasis on 'qualitative method' 1s accompanied by a 
theoretical looseness even carelessness - here reflected .1n 
Will.is' terms <without always knowing how'. The lmporLan t 
fealure to emerge from th.is emphasis upon eUu1ography relates Lo 
a principal aun of Learning Lo Labour, .indieated in the passage 
above, which is the representaLion of human agency in social 
analysis. My observation is that Willis assigns the task of the 
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porLrayal of agency to descripLion deri ving from Lhe 
e Uu1ographlc me Lhod. fu3 lnilica Led a L Lhe s Larl I in Lend Lo show 
LhaL a fund.a.mental prob~em emerges from Lhls emphasis of 
eLhnography over Lheory. Willis does not. explicllly recogni ~e 
the theoreLical presumptions of his method. As a consequence 
hls observations merely confirm those presumptlons; Lhus Lhe 
observations are not held as provisional and open to furLher 
enqu.1ry in relation to a background of systematie theory. I 
intend to show that the result is that Willis is unable lo 
distinguish between his own view of reality from LhaL of his 
subjects. 
description. 
What emerges is a severely flawed ethnographic 
The identification of the 'informal group' 
A key move in Willls' study is the act of circl.1Ill8eribing the 
focal group. This .is a group of twelve working class, 
'non-confoI1I1.ist' boys, 'the lads', who are seen to consLrucL and 
collecLively hold a specific set of eul tural beliefs and 
prd.CL.ices which are created as 'oppositional forms' in relation 
Lo 'dominant .ideology' ( 1977: 4). Willis says Lhat 'the lads' 
have a 'male while working class counter school culture' 
(1977:2). Th.is group of twelve was selected 'on the basis of 
friendship links and membership of some kind of oppositional 
eulLure .in a working class school' (Willis, 1977:4). This very 
sLrategy of circumseribing a particular set of individuals poses 
ser1.ous problems. This group is simply named and an assertion 
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made that they have someLh.i.ng .1n common - a cullure. Thls very 
acL involves Lhe omi.ssion of gender and eLhnic.:..i.Ly, fealures of 
soc.ial llfe wh.ich are necessary for any conception of culLure, 
yeL this ls Lhe guiding concepL of Lhe analys.is. 
For Lhe sake of clariLy and .incls.ion, and .in no way 
lmplylng their lack of lmporlance, olher elhn.ic and 
gender varlanLs are nol examined (1977:2). 
In fact I argue that the elision of a consideration of elhn.icity 
and gender is a necessary pre-condition for the general 
conception of culture which Willis employs.s The study does 
not hold to a s.ingle, '.incisive' deflnltlon of culture as an 
informing concept, and, while several descriptions of the term 
are glven, Lhey refer generally to an autonomous and aulhenLic 
_s_e_t __ o_f _ ___.p_r_-ac_·t_· 1_· c_e_s __ an_d __ be_l_i_e_f_s held by 'infonnal groups' 
(1977:23). The informal group is the pr.imary f~us of Lhe study 
and the . maJor asslllllption (contained 1Il the idea of group 
cul Lure) is U1at the practices and bel.iefs of the group are 
.inherently meanlngful tu lt. The ;•class .identity' (1977:2) 
of 'the lads', then, depends on the.ir whiteness and masculinity 
as primary defining features of the group, and this is taken for 
granted. If they are a group they share a culture, and they are 
a group because they share a culture. 
'The la.w::i' as a eircumscribed group of non-confonn..ist boys sland 
.in the analysis in conlrd.St to 'the ear 'oles', the term 'the 
la.ch:;' give to conformlsl boys outside the group. Scant 
attention is pa.id to the confonnist boys. The prcx.!ess by which 
5This elision has proved to be a maJor focus of criticism on the 
limitations of the analysis (see Appendix). 
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only some boys become non-conformist while others remain 
confo.rmisL .1s noL addressed. Joining the group is a matter of 
'need for friendship' or 'accidental causality' 'si.tLi.ng by so 
and so 1n class, meeting "the lads " at night by chance or being 
"called for" unexpecLedly' ( 1977: 61). The absence of the 
conformist boys is not 'by the way'; it is part of the conceit 
involved in the emphasis on eLhnography. Willis .1s concerned to 
emphasize that the group itself is the construct of agents. The 
analyst is merely an observer of 'whaL is'. The outcome is that 
'culLure' is reified from the outset. It is not a provisional 
ana.ly-Lical coru:;Lruct set up to describe social processes. It 
.1s, rather, a directly observable fact. The group in question 
.1s a 'given' and thls indicates a ma.Jor shorLcontlng. The 
quesLion of what causes some boys to join it in Lhe first place 
rests on the simple accounts that the boys give themselves. 
It is to be noted, however, that Willis focuses upon U1is group 
because it .1s already showing signs of overt rebellioU8ness. It 
is significant that he does not register this reason as Lhe 
basis for his selection. Marcus ( 1986) notes that: 
the most deva8taLing flaw in Learning Lo Labour is Lhe 
self-fulfilling and circular manner in wh.i.ch Willis 
selected his sample and makes broader claims from it 
(1986:176, n.7). 
There lS a basic 
methodological move. 
problem to emerge from this primary 
In making a sub-eul Lure of circunl!::!cr ibed 
groups the focus of analysis and s.i.tuating the sub-cul ture 
within a general context of class Lhe question of the 
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represenLaL.i veness of U1e group .1s foreclosed. For Lhe older 
Lradi L.ion of survey research represenLali veness was Lhe prJ .. mary 
.issue (Connell, 1983:224). 
The circumscribed group does not in any way 'represent' the 
conformist boys who are acknowledged to be working class. The 
conformists have not funned a sub-eulture. Their 'culLu.reless' 
sl..ale, however, is highly slgn.if.icant, and w.ill be considered 
later in relation to Willis' aecount of .ideology. 
In a laLer reflectlon on Lea.rnlp.g to Laoour, Wlllls lndlcates 
the focal point of the 'cultural studies' approach is Lhe idea 
of a 'symbullc eonm1unlLy' having at hand certain and specific 
'received symbolic, ideological and cullural resources' which 
agents actively use to 'explore, make sense of, and postively 
respond lo 'inherited' structural and material conditions of 
exis Lenee' ( 1983: 112) . TI1e focus of the analysis, aecording to 
Will.is, is the 'cultural moment', 'the specifically human and 
collective activity of meaning makirig - the mak.irig sense, if you 
will, of a structural location' (1983:112) [original emphasis]. 
The basic assumption underlying this formulation is of the 
coherence of knowledge and practices 'produced' and held by 'the 
lads' wi thln their 'group' . This 'meaning' at Lhe heart of 
cultural proeesses becomes the focus of ethnographic enquiry: 
... Lhe uncovering of these repressed 
beeomes Lhe especial province of a 
.inf OI1l!al f OI'IllS 
quali Lati ve, 
meU1od ... ethnographic, commensuraLe 'li v lri.g' 
(1983:114). 
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Will.is' 
I 
emphasis on eLhnographic method is in his terms 
vind.icaLed by Lhe need Lu uncover the inherent rneanlngs of 
culLural forms. Th.is move carries a double as:::;ertlon. Firstly , 
.it a:::;serL:::; thaL :::;pe<_;.ific groups have specific culLure:::; and 
secundy t.haL analysis Lakes precedence over 
explicit theoretical arL.iculatlon. Marcu:::; val.idly observe:::; LhaL 
Lhis precedence of eUu1ography over LheoreL.ical explication .is 
Lhe cenLral and construcLive move of Will.is' text (1986:184) and 
should be read as a manifeslo for the value of ethnography in 
research on political economy (1986:175). 
Culture and Rationality 
I will now outline the elemenLs of culture which Willis 
describes explicitly. I note here that Willis is concerned to 
give an explicit accounL of the 'rationality' of working cla:::;s 
studenls, and U1aL what emerges is a seL of basic concepts Lhat 
parallel .1n their basic social effects Bern:::;tein's concept of 
'ccxle' . A direct comparison with Bern:::;te.in's view of culture 
will be made .1n the final chapter. 
'The lad8'' reject.ion of :::;chool and opposition to 
teachers can be seen in the light of a penetration of 
the teaching paradigm ..• Their culture denies Lhat 
knowledge is in any sense a meaningful 'equivalent' for 
Lhe generality of working class kids. It 'sees 
tru·ough' the tautologies and ma.n.lpulati ve modif i.cations 
of the basic paradigm whether dignified with 
'relevant'/'progessive' ... theories or not. It 'knows' 
betLer than the new vocational guidance what is the 
real state of the job market. 
The counter-school 
glint of steel 
culture thus prov.ides an eye to Lhe 
benealh the usual instltuLional 
ke.rfuffle in 
pracLices buL 
exposes some 
conLra<l.ic L.ions 
I I 
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the school. It has its own specific 
it also searches out and critically 
of the crucial social Lransactions and 
w.i th.in e<lucat.ion (Will.is, 1977 : 126). 
IL mighL be observed from Lh.i.8 passage that Will.is depicts the 
culLure as the true agent, not the individual participant in 
iL.6 While W.illis explicitly a.1ms to vlrtray the active 
processes of agenL8 en.gaged .1n producing 'class .identity' 
(1977:2), this activity is Laken ouL of their ha.nds and 8ubsumed 
by 'culture. ' 'The lads' are merely bearers of a culture which 
l Lself does the 'seeing,' 'knowirig,' and 'peneLrating' and 
c.riL.i.cal exposing of contradictions within schools. (And it is 
the culture itself which ultimately does the 'resisting' and 
't.rarn:,for,u.irig' of the dom.i.nan.t cul Lure, which .is expressed in 
e<lucaL.i.on Lhrough the teachirig paradigm.) TI1.i.s pre:::;entation is 
all the more startling in view of Willis' objections to the 
deterministic nature of previous 'reproduction' theories, 
.including that of Althusser, and his own call for: 'an 
explanatory account which avoids this formalism and rational.ism' 
(1983:115). 
Why Lhen is there this reification of culture when W.illis' 
express concern is Lo portray the active, vol.it.ion.al and 
creative aspects of agents .in social proce8ses? And how doe8 
lhl8 v.1ew of culture tally w.ith the nollon of 'prax.is' in 
6This account of culture as agent clearly indicates a profound 
Althusserian influence and reflects the metaphor of subjects being 
'spoken' by discourse. While there is a point to the metaphor in 
opposing the notion of the autonomous subject as the self-possessed 
centre of social agency, the metaphor carries the further implication 
that structures are themselves agents (Turner, 1983:197). The frame-
work set up by Willis implies an extremely literal interpretation of 
this metaphor. 
I I 
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Will.is' wrltlng as the active and collectlve use of received 
cultural resources to respond Lo inher.iLed condl.tlon..8 of 
exlsLence? In order to answer Lhese quesL.i.oll.8 iL is first 
nece!:::i!:::iary to con!:::ilder Willis' accoun.L of 'raLionall Ly' and 
'loglc' . A further is!:::iue which is part of thi!:::i formulaLion J.S 
the way .1n which these concepts ulLimaLely become coll.8Lrued as 
'choice' and tdecision' (1977:1). 
Cultural and individual levels of reality 
According to Willis the conceptual distinction which has to be 
made in order to see the rationality of working cla.8s student 
behaviour .1s the distinction between tthe level of Lhe cultural 
anc.l Lhe level of p.r-d.Ctical consciousness in our specification of 
creativity and rdtionality' ·( 1977: 122). The purpose of this 
distinction, according to Willis, is lo locate the proper focus 
of analysis. Prwactical consciousness, accord.irig to Willi!:::i, l!:::i 
'most open to distrd.Ctlon and momentary influence' ( 1977: 122) . 
The culture lS not. Accordirigly t direct and expllci t 
corisc.1ousness may .1n some senses be our poorest and least 
ralional guide' (1977:122). 
Willis locates the analysis in tthe cultural' in order to depict 
a true picLure of the 'rational impulse' of groups expressed 
Lhrough culture. These impulses are not 'basically centred on 
the acLing lndividual and his consciousness' (1977:122). 
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The cenLral asserLion .1n Willis' concepL of culLure is LhaL 
' ... the logic of class or group lnleresLs .i.s clifferenL from Lhe 
logic of individual interests' (1977:128). Th.is furmulaL.iun 
reflecLs an underlying Durkheinuan sociology whereby Lhe group 
.1s 'more than Lhe sum of Lhe .i.ncllvlclual parts' (1977:123) and, 
furtheriuore, 'can be consiclered as a subject .i.n its own righL' 
(1977:124). The 'creativity' conLained .1n praxis, Lhenr .i.s 
entirely dependent upon collective logic:7 
Creativity 
head, and 
ILs logic 
group level 
is .1n no individual act, nu one particular 
is nut the result of conscious intention. 
could only occur, as I argue later, at the 
(1977.120). 
The fa.i.lure of working class students in education and their 
subsequent 'entraµnent' in manual labour is represented as a 
'choice' (1977:1) which can only be construed as 'rational' in 
relation to the structure of the collective logic. 
Praxis, for Willis, .1s collect.i.ve action, of some clescription 
comple Lely clepenclen t upon tl1e prior notion of collee Live logic. 
The .individual 'agent' 1.s then entirely dependent up:Jn group 
logic and Lrue praxis .1s the ' ..• impulse of Lhe group Lo f.i.nd an 
objective specific to its own level in a way not limited by the 
previous knowledge experience or ideology of its individual 
members' (1977:124). The outcome of this formulation is that 
change or transfonnation can only occur through collective 
activity built upon prior collective logic. The question then 
7The 'alternative knowledge' (1983:108) which is generated through 
collective logic must also be held by the group but not by any 
particular individual in it. 
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arises of how change or transformation is construed in the 
analysis and the significance of the notion of 'cultural logic' 
in the way transformation is seen to take place. 
Anthony Giddens gives the following commentary on Learning to 
Labour: 
... a given set of social activities (the occupational 
behaviour of 'the lads') is interpreted as purposeful 
action. In other words those activities are shown to 
be carried out ln the lntentlonal way, for certain 
reasons, within conditions of knowledgeability. 
Speciflcatlon of those bounds allows the analyst Lo 
show how unintended consequences of the activities in 
question derive from what the agents did 
intentionally. The interpretation involves an 
attrlbulion of rationality and of motivation Lo the 
agents concerned. The actors have reasons for what 
they do, and what they do has certain specifiable 
consequences which they do not intend (1984:294) 
[emphasis added]. 
My observation is that this description is not an adequate 
account of Learning to Labour and that Giddens does not give 
any critical attention to the concept of culture which Willis 
employs, nor the way it is linked with 'class'. This concept of 
class-culture is critical in the way rationality is attributed 
to 'the lad.8' Lhrough the 'motivations' and intentions which 
their behaviours are seen to carry. 
It should be remarked that in this ethnogra.phic analysis Willis 
gives ample evidence of active defiance of 'the lads' to the 
processes of schooling th.rough individual and collective 
obstruction of classrooms, and institutional forms of schooling 
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generally. The primary quest.ion, however, .is the way ln which .. 
voli t.ional def lance is corIBtrued a8 'opposi t.i.on' . The baslc 
problem of W.illis' descrlption lles in lhe way it 'attributes 
rationall ty' ( to use Giddens' terms) Lo 'Lhe lam:;'' behav .iour, 
given that he proceeds to attribute ends and reasons and hence 
levels of 'rationallty' wh.i.ch are far beyond thaL suggested by 
the evidence presented. 
'The lads'' opposition takes defiant forms such as- drinking 
alcohol at lunchtime (1977:21) 'wagging', 'dossing' - or going 
to sleep in classes (1977:27) and fighting those outside the 
group (1977:35). 'The lads' are also inveterate players of 
practical jokes on staff, other students and the community 
outs.ide Lhe school. In their terms th.is is 'having a laf f' 
(1977:29). The element which Willis emphasizes in these 
descrlptlons .1s the aetlve defiance contained in activities and 
the annoyance they present to staff and conformist students in 
the wasting of 'valuable time' (1977:28). The account is quite 
persuasive in the description of the actively defiant purposes 
of 'the lads'' behaviour. 
Willis also offers instances of discourse where these activities 
become the focus of group discussion. 
Willis documents the conscious defiance quite precisely: 
PW: "What's Lhe last Lime you've done some 
writing?" 
Will: "When we done some writing?" 
Fuzz: 
PW: 
Fuzz: 
"Oh, are., 
writ tyes' 
me heart." 
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last t.ime WdS in careers, 'cos I 
on a piece of paper, that broke 
"Why dld .iL break your hearl?" 
"I mean Lo wr.i Le, 'cos I Wd.S go.ing Lo Lry 
to go Lhrough the Ler,n wi LhouL wr.i L.irig 
any U1.ing . ' Co8 s .inee we ' ve come hi.ck I 
a.in'L dun nothlng" [.iL was half way through 
Lenn] ( 1977: 27) . 
These aetivit.ies are seen a8 crucial elements in the active 
consLrueL.ion and maintenance of group identity and solidarity in 
oppos.ition to glven for1ns. Willis suggests that these 
activities express core 'themes' or values: 
... being free out of class, being in class and doing no 
work, belng in the wrong elass, roaming the corridors 
looklrig for excl ternerrL, beirig asleep in private. The 
core skill which articulates these possibilities is 
being able to get out of any . given class: the 
preservation of personal mobility (1977:27). 
That these activities contain elements of volltional defiance ls 
not .1n question. They can be seen to eontain conse.ioUB motives 
'I was going to try Lo go through the Lernt wi U1out writing 
anythlng.' Willis, however, is not satisfied with this level of 
'raLional' ex plan.a Lion and sets the activities into a much 
larger scheme related to class. Following Lhe CCCS approach, 
the informal group lS 'the basic unit of the culture' (1977:23) 
and these eultures are seen to be created by agencies 
'concretely in determinate conditions' (1977:59). These 
sub-cultures are 'partieular manifestations' of worklng class 
culLure. They all share 'similar basic strueLural properties' 
which are Uie properties of class society (1977:59). 
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The · t cul tu.re' which t the lad.8' cons Lruct is a t par Llcular 
m.anifestaLlon' of the larger strucLure of wurklng cla8s 
cullu.re. The concepL of worklng class cullu.re Lhen .Ls an 
analyl.ical caLegory derived from the disL.i.llaLiun of numerous 
particular m.anifestallorIB. It is Lherefore necessary to ::;el Lhe 
actlvitles of tthe lads'' counter school culture against thls 
larger s tructw:-dl pattern ln order to see the t true nature and 
slgn.i.flcanee' (1977:52) of those activlties, that is the real 
ent.IB Luwards whlch they are seen to be directed. 
The 'pa.rtieular ends' toward!:) which the cullural activities of 
tt.he lcl.CIB' are applied take on a much larger slgnificance when 
:::;ituated in the larger frdJilework of class culture because of the 
klnd of 'significance' which .LS Lhen given to micro 
oppositional' forms. The opposition of 'the lads' to the formal 
practices of the school becomes a particular manifestation of 
general working class alienation and struggle (1977:59). The 
Lypes of upposilions in which 'the lads' lndulge in the 
immediate and particular environment of the school come Lo be 
seen as manifestations of class topposition'. These activlties 
are rational not merely in the sense that they have volitional 
content, or that they relate Lo Lhe purposeful creation and 
maintenance of the group. Rather Lhey texpose at some level the 
consequences of belonging to a class for lLs members' 
(1977:129). At one and the same time they expose 'the false 
individualistic promises of domlnant ideology as they operdte in 
the school' (1977:129) and express opposition to Lhem. They 
-81-
Lherefore become the latenL element.. of cla.8s struggle. ' The 
lc:i.C.IB', however, have litLle or no con.sc.i.ousness of class or the 
hlsLorical dynamics of struggle. What they have .ts an 
'experlence' of oppression aga.i.nst whlch Lhey revolL. I L .1s 
im:[.X.>rLanL Lo note, however, that this 'experience' .ts itself 
shaped and g.i.ven the form that .it has by 'culture' .s 
Willis' Basic Concepts - Inconsistencies 
A number of inconsistencies in the basic terms of Willis' theory 
w.i.11 now be consldered. 
Sub-culture as a manifestation of working class culture 
There are two maJor theoretical problems ill the way the counLer-
school culLure is set in the 'larger .pat.tern of worklng class 
culture' (1977:52). Firstly, there is the idea of manifestation 
of class forms. Will.is suggests that. iL is wrong Lo see working 
class culture as 'standard clonal cla.8s modules spontaneously 
reproducing themselves in an .inevitable pattern' (1977:59); yet 
the very term 'manifestation' carr.tes something of this idea. 
There is a major unresolved theoretical problem ln the setting 
of man.ifestations of culture against the assertion that they are 
'created speclflcally, concretely .tn detenninale condillons' 
(1977:59). This lack of resolution . 1.8 expressed 
followlng stalements: 
8This is the primary point of contention between Hall, Jo hnson and 
others who assert that all experience is culturally deter~ined 
(Johnson 1 1981:392) and E P Thompson, who stresses that a distinction 
must be made between social being and that which impinges upon it 
(Thompson 1 1981:405). 
1.n lhe 
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'Soclal forms ... have 8llnul taneously bo Lh a loc.;al or 
ln8tlLuLional loglc, and a larger c.;la.8s loglc.; c.;ould not 
develop and be arLic.;ulaLed wi LhouL U1ese reglonal 
instances of struggle, nor could, however, Lhese 
insLanc.;es be dlfferentialed internally and slruc.;Lured 
sysLemaLlc.;ally in relaLlon lo olher insLanc.;es and Lhe 
reprod.ucllon of Lhe whole wlLhouL Lhe larger logic.; 
(1977:60). 
The c.;reaL.ive acL.ions (of agenls) .1s set againsL manifestation 
(of class structure) and is an example of the unresolved 
polarities of agency/structure and volition/deLermination which 
pervade the analysis. Connell observes that Willis' analysis 
and cccs analyses .in general are bound lo a reproduction of the 
notion of an homogenous .inner c.;ore of class slrucLure, and 
consequently cannot give a true account. of the dynamics of this 
process (1983:225)9 Th.is observation .LS clearly val.idaLed. 
Class culture and authenticity 
The very fact that the ac..;L.ivities focused upon by the analysis 
are Lhose of a part.ic.;ular group (whlch .is, .in Lurn, a sub-group 
of a cla.8s) becomes highly significant in Lhe analysis. The 
analysis sets up a contrast between the group logic of Lhe 
sub-culture with the amorphous 'individualism' of the ideology 
of the school. 
individualism. 
The conformist boys are part of this amorphous 
They lack cul Lw·e and therefore idenL.i.ty. They 
are victims of the 'false lnd.ividual.islic promises of dominant 
ideology' (1977:129). They have given up 'all possibilities of 
.independence and creation for nothirig buL an illusory ideal of 
classlessness' (1977:128). Willis states thaL: 
~Connell himself maintains an emphasis upon reproduction but has 
attempted to shift the focus of analysis toa concern with historical 
process (following E P Thompson) (Connell & Irving, 1980:1). 
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The coun Ler school culture and other working class 
cultural forms contain element s towards a pr ofound 
critique of the dominant ideology of i ndividualism in 
our society (1977:128/9 ) . 
Here there is a direct opposition of t he ' cul t ural forms ' of the 
sub-culture to 'ideology'. This is in essence an opposition of 
a pure cultural treality' against conlaluinated ideology. 
Indeed, Willis, at certain points, explicitly asserts Lhe 
tpurity' of the rational activity of the worklng class. This 
amounts Lo an lnversion of Lhe humanist conception of cult ure. 
The working class, by virtue of its position, is open to humane 
'rational principles'. The dominant class is driven by ba.Be 
'natural' impulses such as greed: 
The working class view would be the rational one were 
it not located in class society (1977:57). 
And again: 
... the working class is the only class not inherently 
structured from within by the ideological intricacy 
of capitalist organization. It does not take nor, 
therefore, need to hold the cultural and social 
"initiative" and is thus potentially freer from its 
logic (1977:123). 
The very notion of culture employed by Willis is l i nked 
.inextricably to class through the notions of opposition t o and 
tpenetration of' dominant forms. The tends' to which it is 
di.reeled, are, 1.n essence, those of critique of dominan t forms. 
Marcus observes that Willis sees working class cul t ure as 
embodying a latent and authentic critical theory (1986:180 ) . 
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The rnosL bas.i.c flaw .1n Willis' analysis is in setting up Lhe 
acL.i.vit.i.es of tthe lads' as cultural forms which are not only 
inherenLly meaningful to Lhe group but also inherently criLical 
of the falseness of larger ideological structures. In this the 
level of significance attributed to the volitional component of 
micro events becomes massively over-generalized. The concept of 
culture as it is employed by Willis has therefore a dual 
function. In Marcus' terms: 
Willis defines an autonomous culture concept that 
facilitates the authentic depiction of human diversity 
and difference against the bias to elide it ... [and] the 
staging of the cultural for the purpose of ethnographic 
representation is primarily a means to the end of 
elucidation of an embedded critique of capitalist 
society in working class life (1986:180) [emphasis 
added] . 1 O 
Penetrations, limitations 
Specifically, the culture of 'the lads' exposes for its members 
the false promises of upward social mobility through the gaining 
of qualifications (1977:129). The activities of the group are 
seen to 'penetrate' the conventions, structures and ideology of 
the school and to 'oppose' them. The precise details of the 
processes of penetration and exposure are not given. The 
oppositional culture then not only opposes, but penetrates and 
exposes. It is seen as inherently and essentially meaningful 
behaviour to the group and directed towards egalitarian ends. 
lOA classical anthropological problem manifests itself constantly in 
Willis' theory: that is ascribing a systematic philosophy to 
institutional practices. Douglas (1969) suggests that 'The anthro-
pologist who draws out the whole scheme of the cosmos which is implied 
in these practices does the primitive culture great violence if he seems 
to present the cosmology as a systematic philosophy subscribed to 
consciously by individuals (1969:96). 
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Limitations: the inability of culture to translate itself 
into policical theory 
Willis admits that there is a l.imiL to working class 'cultural 
penetrations' by virtue of the fact that they are dominated and 
show internal div.is.ions and inconsistencies. He indicates that 
cultural penetrations and associated practices fall short of 
transformative political activity because of the partiality of 
the penetrations (1977:145). The 'partiality' of the 
penetrations also rests on the way they are construed in the 
analysis. 
'symbolic' .11 
They are, . in essence, 'cultural' and therefore 
They do not take the form of . a conscious 
explicit theory. They are also clearly 'limited' by the 
bolllldaries of the micro-environment in which they are 
generated. They perceive only those oppressive structures of 
capitalism which present themselves through school practices 
struclured by capitalist ideology. They contain merely a latent 
critique which is not aetuali~ed. 
Willis, .1n response to criticism!::i made of Learning Lo Labour, 
states that the notion of cultural production suggests the 
possibility of transformation of structures through the active 
participation of social agents who 'not only think like 
theorists but act like activists' (1983:114). This assertion 
stands in stark contrast to an earlier statement that 'working 
class distrust and rejection of theory _comes partly from a kind 
of recognition ... of the hollowness of theory 1.n its social 
llThe collective and symbolic nature of penetrations indicates, again, a 
Durkheimian framework in Willis' analysis. There is, however, a problem 
in exactly how a critique is to be given of the retrograde elements within 
these practices. If these 'penetrations' symbolize an ultiiate reality they 
must be adequate to representing it - otherwise they would not be there. 
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guise' ( 1977: 57) . It seems clear, however, that 'theory' is 
not likely to be a regular item of working class discourse, and 
there is more than a hint of projection of the analyst's own 
distrust of theory .in this statement. 
Radical insight, resistance and liberation 
As indicated, the central problem in Willis' analysis is in the 
way meaning is attributed to tthe lads'' anti-school practices. 
Willis implies that all practices become significant by 
reference to a cultural meaning or group logic. Working class 
culture generally (and tthe lads'' culture as a subset of it) is 
open to 'radical .insight' (1977:125) because of its not being 
'inherently structured from within by the ideological intricacy 
of capitalist organization' (1977:123). The working class 
culture is seen to stand opposed to middle class culture which 
is contaminated by tdisqualification and self-mystification' of 
capitalist ideology (1977:125). 
Working class culture is, then, constructed upon a series of 
pervading radical insights which find expression in cultural 
form. Cultural forms are, in turn, examples of 'lived 
demonstration' (1977:125) shaped by pr.tor radical insights. 
Everything that 'the lads' do has behind it a precision, a 
purpose and direction by which the oppression and contradictions 
of capitalist forms are recognized, questioned, exposed and 
resisted with the qualification that this is done tat the 
group level' (Willis 1977:120). 
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This radical insight not expressed at the level of 
consc.1ousness but in oppositional cultural forms - leads to a 
ll bera t.ion: 
By penetrating the contradiction at the heart of the 
working class school the counter school culture helps 
to liberate its members from the burden of conformism 
and conventional achievement. It allows their 
capacities and potential to take root elsewhere 
( 1977: 130) . 
So among working class participants lack of success has a 
functional outcome in that they turn away or are 'deflected' 
into their own 'autonomous' and 'authentic' forms of expression 
and social belng. This ls the way whlch Willis envisages the 
'transformation' of fornis through cotmter culture. Rather than 
actually tFd.IlSf arming 'the system' the defiant behaviour of 'the 
lads' is aimed at the group itself, and expresses important 
cultural values of the group, to the group. 
expressed in fighting are given particular attention: 
The values 
Many important cultural values are expressed through 
fighting. 'Masculine hubris, dramatic display, the 
solidarity of the group, the importance of quick, 
clear and not over-moral thought ... (1977:34). 
Violence is thus construed as essentially rational behaviour 
because of its reference to group meaning (1977:35). Willis 
explicitly admits, however, that violence and other 'anti-
social' behaviour does not point to an 'overthrow of the soclal 
order' but to 'social meaning within "Lhe lads'" own culture' 
(1977:35). 
-88-
Liberation or entrapnent? 
More importanLly , perhaps, the t ra.dical insight' of the counter 
culture inevitably leads to its own educational suppression 
through <unintended consequences' (1977:60) . This metaphor of 
irony which is constantly raised in Willis' writing, not only in 
Learning to Labour but also in later accounts (Willis 1983), 
indicates a Iill:iJor inadequacy in the mode of analysis. It 
attributes to actions intentionality and purpose which agents do 
not actually have (on the evidence presented). It is because 
defiance is construed as a precisely defined purpose with a 
critical end that there is no other possible outcome than 
tself-damnation'. 
The 'resolution' of the concepts of volition and determination 
through 'irony' and 'paradox' (Willis 1971:12; 1983:107) ls the 
only possible outcome of the analysis because of its inability 
to resolve these concepts ln an articulated theory. Irony and 
paradox may be interesting descriptive strategies but are not 
theoretical constructs. They are not adequate outcomes of an 
analysis which aims to provide a social account of the causes of 
working class educational failure and a program of intervention 
in education. The result is that nothing is transfor,ned and the 
description and analysis become locked in a series of 
irreconciliable sets of 'antinomies' to use Willis' own term. 
This issue will be considered further in relation to Willis' 
overall mcxle of theorizing. 
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It should be noted Lhat the lack of co-operative participalion 
on the pa.rt of 'the lads' is construed as a refusal to compete, 
which "because of this intentional content then "becomes a 
'radical' act: 'it refuses to collude in its own educational 
suppression)(1977:128). 
The type of radicalism which 'the lads' portray is very inert, 
if it is radicalism at all, and it is only assumed that the only 
structures which are transformed are those of the working class 
itself. Willis does not suggest that the system as a whole 
feels any real pressure from the acts of 'resistance', even 
though staff register some annoyance at the activities and 
attitudes of 'the lads' . This emphasis upon cultural autonomy 
reflects the traditional problem noted by Hebdige (1979:76) 
associated with accounts of sub-culture - 'functioning outside 
the larger political and econorruc context.' In this case 
'indifferent to that context' is perhaps a more accurate 
description. 
Broadly speaking, the analysis 1.s unsatisfactorily vague on the 
precise relationship between the concepts of 'insight' or 
'penetration' and cultural 'autonomy'. It 1.s assumed that 
insight creates autonomy, in the first instance, and autonomy 
leads to an opermess to insight. There 1.s no theoretical 
. the setting up and linking of these terms in the prec1.s1.on in 
analysis. What this suggests is that the kind of conceptual 
theorizing 1.n which Willis indulges 1.S a post-hoc 
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raLlonallzaLion and justification of 'practical' ethnography. 
As indicated this amounts to a need to privilege ethnographic 
method over theoretical articulation (Marcus, 1986:180). 
Resistance and liberating educational practice 
As indicated, Willis' account rests on the fundamental 
assLnnption that the behaviour and attitudes of the group are 
'rational' because they reflect some degree of prior penetration 
of oppressive conventions and ideology, and consequently express 
dissatisfaction with and opposition to those conventions. They 
therefore represent an authentic and rational response to 
contradictions evident to those not contaminated by dominant 
ideology. 
Within Willis' analysis 'resistance' . is a 'cultural' 
phenomenon . Oppression is already registered by the sub-culture 
.Ln it8 cultural fonns and its participants are open to the 
possibilities of liberating change. The assumption contained in 
this formulation of 'cultural production' is that there is 
always an active, basically humane and egalitarian response to 
the experience of domination on the part of class-based 
sub-cultures, even though some responses to domination are 
misdirected. The process of cultural production is seen as the 
continuous impulse at the level of culture for the 
transformation of states of being of participants through a 
search for 'meaning'. A 'liberating practice' then has merely 
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t o engage the cul t ure at significant IXJints where 'recognition' 
of principal oppressive forms has already taken place. 
Ge lling the participants 1.n the sub-culture consciously t o 
recognize oppression, however, is the principal issue in 
education. It 1.s the pracLical problem of generaLing a 
liberating practice. And Willis' analysis must be questioned 
seriously on at least three basic matters. Firstly, doe8 the 
behaviour of 'the lads' reflect an actual recognition of the 
prec1.se way in which the conventions of the school are 
oppressive of their class and are they in any sense open Lo the 
moves of a practitioner who . is concerned with their 
'liberation'? Secondly, is it in fact a 'paradox' that the 
theory 8uggests that the processes of recognition of oppressive 
forms beyond the group result in a momentum towd.I'ds extreme 
internal closure? Or is this again Lhe result of bad theorizing 
which traps itself in a paradox? Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, how does a liberating practitioner approach the 
working class students who are not part of a sub-culture, who 
have not formed the 'cultural' recognition of oppression which 
is to be the basis for liberation? 
Functionalism 
Counter school culture and the shop floor 
Willis is concerned specifically with the problem of explaining 
the paradox contained in 'the lads'' affirmation of the value of 
-92-
manual labour over mental labour. He focuses upon the conscious 
association by 'the lads' of manual labour with maleness and its 
perceived superiority over mental labour which is associated 
with femaleness (1977:148). This affirmation of manual labour 
is thus a core 'theme' which shapes the very identities of white 
working class males. 
The way ~n which Willis explains the 'rationality' of this 
affirmation relies on 'the lads' prior recognition of the 
falseness of the capitalist division of labour. Firstly, this 
affirmation is perceived as recognizing the divisive nature of 
certification (1977:152) which results in the 'elitist exclusion 
of the mass through . spurious recourse to merit' (1977:128). 
Secondly, and at a more profound level, the sub-culture 
recognizes the falseness of 'abstract labour' in that it 
alienates the worker and 'empties work of its significance' 
(1977:152).12 The first recognition is to 'the lads'' refusal 
to compete' (1977:125) which expresses the spontaneous tendency 
of the sub-culture in asserting the need for an egalitarian 
'connnuni ty' . The second recognition however is explained by a 
much more complex 'cultural' account focused upon patriarchy: 
We might say that where the principle of general 
abstract labour has emptied work of lts significance 
from the inside a transformed patriarchy has filled 
lt wlth significance from the outside (1977:150). 
121t is to be noted that Willis' methodology continually construes the 
analyst's theoretical insights as belonging to the reality of the group 
under study. There is simply no way in which the behaviour of 'the 
lads' contains these sorts of theoretical positions. Hy observation is 
that Willis simply does not know the limitations of ethnography and that 
the 'insights' which he attributes to his subjects are at best 
irresponsible and at worst dangerous. 
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In short, nature abhors a vacuum, and the natural tendency of 
groups to infuse things with 'significance' is irrepressible. 
TI1e following sentence indeed carries great signif.i.cance for the 
whole of W.i.llis' enLerprise: 
Discontent with work is hinged away from a political 
discontent and confused in its proper logic by a huge 
detour into the symbolic sexual realm (1977:150). 
Willis adds: 
The brutality of the working situation is partially 
reinterpreted into a heroic exercise of manly 
confrontation with the task (1977:150). 
The end result is a surprising 1k.ffirmation of labour power' 
( 1977: 149) . The 'paradox' whereby insight is totally contai.ned 
within 'the system' becomes complete. For the group concerned 
the 'stigma' of manual work becomes 'positively expressive' 
(1977:152). For 'the lads' then, the opting out of mental labour 
and the celebration of 'manly' manual labour is seen as a 
process of ·. systematic ~self-prepa.rtion' for manual labour 
(1977:97). 
The outcome of this analysis is that the counter school culture 
and the shop floor culture become functionally linked. 
Functionalism 
As already suggested the functionalism of Learning to Labour is 
not incidental. It is an outcome of the mode of theoretical 
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analysis which is employed, and the extreme idealizations 
contained in the very concept of culture which Willis set s up. 
A consideraLion of Giddens' corrrrnents on Learning t o Labour may 
help to h.i.ghlighL the functionalism of t he theoretical 
presumptions underlying Willis' deployment of the ethnographic 
method. Within Giddens' analysis the positions offered by 
Willis are seen as being in accord, generally, with his own 
theory of 'structuration', stressing social activity, purpos.1ve 
action and the unintended _~onsequences of such action (Giddens, 
1984:294). Using this framework, Giddens interprets Learning to 
Labour as a type of analysis which stands in contrast to 
functional analyses (1984:293). Giddens' criticism of 
functionalist accounts is that: 
usually ... attention is concentrated upon attributing 
rationality to a social system, not to individuals .. 
The identification of a functional need of the system 
is presumed to have explanatory value, calling into 
play consequences which in some way meet that need 
(1984:294). 
Giddens' account 1s highly selective in the elements of Willis' 
social theory on which it focuses. He pays no de Lalle<l 
attention to the concept of culture offered by Willis. 
As indicated earlier in Willis' theoretical expose of Learning 
to Labour, the behaviour of 'the lads' requires interpretation 
against a higher level of 'cultural logic' in order to be seen 
as purposive and 'rational'. And, 1n fact, Learning to Labour 
exhibits the principal deficiency to which Giddens points in 
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functionalist social theories that is, it attributes 
'rationality to a social system, not to individuals' (1984:294). 
Giddens furthermore gives his assent to Willis' explanation of 
the role of 'culture' in the reproduction of social forms 
through the 'unintended consequences' of purposive action on the 
part of 'the lads': 
The aggressive, joking culture which they have 
developed within the school milieu actually quite 
strongly resembles that of the shop-floor culture of 
work situations into which they tend to move. Hence 
they find the adjustment to work relatively easy, and 
Lhey are able to tolerate the demands of doing dull, 
repetitive labour in circumstances which they 
recognize to be incongenial. The unintended and 
ironical consequence of their 'partial penetration' 
of the limited life chances open to them is actively 
to perpetuate the conditions which limit those very 
life chances (Giddens, 1984:293). 
Giddens seems to be quite unaware of the strongly 'functional' 
flavour of this account. In effect it does not differ from 
Parsons' account of education functioning to create in students 
differentiated commitments and capacities for successful 
performance of their future adult roles' which are, in turn, 
differentiated according to status (Parsons 1961:434). The 
operative word in this passage is 'commitment' which may be set 
beside Giddens' 'tolerate the demands of doing dull, repetitive 
labour ... ' . Giddens' connnentary is a pertinent example of the 
lack of a sustained critique which has been characterlstic of 
'cultural studies' and its role in sociological and educational 
Lheory. 
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Willis' Revisions 
In a later reflection on Learning to Labour Willis puts forward 
a series of significant revisions. His express concerns in the 
revisions are a 'de-emphasis of the "left functionalist" side of 
... previous work' expressed in textual tenns as an 
'over-developed symmetry 
further 
and irony' (1983:107). In his 
rev.1s1-ons Willis emphasizes the 'isomorphism of 
culture' , by which he means a tendency of sub-cultures towards 
self-closure (1983:132). The fundamental decisions of 
subordinate groups are 'votes' for a certain kind of 'cultural 
solidarity' - not 'votes for the social order' (1983:133). 
The lJa.sic form of the revision is the assertion that the 
resources of this sub-culture are not pure but carry the values 
of pre-existing social relationships: 
... there is no pure struggle of the oppressed, no 
pure resistance, no utopianism, which does not work 
through the contradictionsand contrary effects of its 
own prcxiuction (1983:133). 
Willis, therefore, suggests a ma.Jar revision of the earlier 
theory in which the working class was seen to generate its own 
autonomous existence and not to be 'inherently structured from 
within by the ideological intricacy of capitalist organization' 
(1977:123). Rather, the structure of capital is not 'external 
and separate from the everyday life of society' (1983:133). So 
what U1en is working class culture? 
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In many respects, Willis' modification of his theory is 
interesting but ambiguous. He further emphasizes the closure of 
culture and the pervasive nature of capitalisL ideology in 
elements of working class life_ at the same time. Th.is move 
undermines the ideas of 'insight' and 'penetration' that 
informed Learning to Labour, and were a necessary element in his 
for,nulation of the activities of the group as counter-culture or 
resistance. Willis indicates that the basic analytical 
mechanism of penetration/limitation was misleading and led to a 
mechanistiu separation of what is 'all of a piece in cultural 
production' (1983:128). This 1s nothing short of a complete 
undermining of his basic theoretical structure. My observation, 
however, is that Willis either does not recognize this outcome 
or he does not care; either way the problem is due to a lack of 
proper recognition of the need for a degree of objectivity and 
theoretical integrity. 
Moreover, the revisions outlined by Willis do nothing to extrB.Ct 
the analysis from the polarities of agency/structure in whi1 ~h it 
is locked. The revision downplays the significance of the 
notion of 'penetration', in favour of that of transfonnation, 
but the basic concepts of culture and action as "based upon 
collective logic .are not challenged. 
Of greatest interest in the later work 1s the way in which, 
ironically, 
proilllnence. 
the functionalist element achieves greater 
By transformation Willis means 'the rendering of 
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certain specific kinds of, perhaps future, oppression and 
exploitation into the different terms of immediate, local and 
sensuous culture' (1983:132) (emphasis added). The renewed 
emphasis on transformation means, in essence, that working class 
groups are seen more than ever to turn into their own tcultural' 
worlds and create practices which are meaningful to themselves 
alone. They do not, therefore, confront oppression directly. 
The cultural forms generated in this fashion are 'functional' to 
the group in that they help the group to lessen the direct force 
of oppression by deflectlng it Uu·ough the creation and 
celebration of their own concerns. It ls highly sign.ificant 
that those concerns of the sub-culture are described as 
immediacy and sensuality. These of course are the traditional 
characteristics ascribed by conservative accounts to the working 
class in accounting for its failure. They are also the ascribed 
characteristics which are focused and confirmed in Bernstein's 
account of public language-use and restricted code (1971: 34). 
Secondly, this account mirrors very closely P.-drsons' account of 
youth culture which has the function of 'mitigating the strain' 
caused by the selective education process (1961:447). 
By lessening the emphasis on the concept of 'penetration' Willis 
is necessarily downplaying the idea of a latent critique 
embedded in the cultural forrru:; of the sub-culLure. The other 
maJor revision takes the fonn of an increased emphasis on the 
notion of cultural production as caused by a pervasive class 
struggle. A pivotal assertion made in the revision is that 'the 
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lads'' cullure is a form of 'class struggle' (1983:124) and 
that, furthermore, cultural production takes place through 
'struggle and res.istance to structures l!l domination' 
(1983 :135). Cultural production is a process of formation of 
subjects th.rough 'struggle'. In fact, 'the key link and common 
ground between the two terms "subjects" and "structure" is 
struggle' (1983:135). 
This formulation of the relation between subjects and structure 
as struggle retains a problematic elision prominent in the 
original. For it 1.s fair enough to suggest that the experiences 
and practices of 'the lads' reflect class oppres8ion - but that 
does not mean that such experiences and practices are 1.n 
Lhemsel ves an embryonic fonn of class struggle. 'The lads' 
clearly exper1.ence oppress1.on and, al certain polnts, ac..:h.ieve 
degrees of con8clous understanding of their class position, Um. t 
1.s, of their llm..iteu prospects for future employment and of the 
llmlted and oppress1.ve nature of whaLever employment they are 
likely to achieve. They are not able, however, translate these 
'limited' insights into purposive and constructive class action 
to lillprove their position, nor can they develop a critical 
discourse. In fact, in retaining in his revisions the idea of 
culture emerging as active opposition to the realm of language, 
Willis actively downplays the need for an historically formed 
theory of political contestation, expressed 1.n critical 
discourse, whlch in Marxist theory is a practical prerequisite 
for positive action and genuine 'struggle'. 
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The idea that practices, dispositions and attitudes are given 
the forms whlch they have through the action of class is 
coherent and interest.ing enough. But there is a vast difference 
between thal account and one which construes such fonns as 
express.ing not only the action of class but an immanenl 
'sLruggle' wh.ich pervades everything. The general plcture 
presented by Willis, then, is of cultural sLruggle informing Lhe 
vasL part of social life for members of opposltlonal 
sub-cultures fonned 'in resistance to domination' ( 1983: 135) . 
In Willis' v.tew, whlle there may be little conscious awareness 
of struggle resistance on the part of individual 
partlcipants 
and 
of the subordinate culture in question, the 
structures of the group are fonned through struggle, and as 
responses to dominant forms. The forms themselves express at 
some deep level the dynamics of class struggle. 
Willis' analysis, despite .its location .1n Marxist discourse 
reflects a classical Durkheimian sociology. Its limitations in 
point for,n are as follows: 
the basic preIIllse is that the whole is definitive and that 
the collectivity is greater than the Sl.Dll of its component 
parts; 
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its basic frdIIlework employs traditional concepts of soclal 
structure (in disguised form) and culture which are 
functionally linked and the primary function is social 
cohesion of the group, through the creation of social 
identity; 
it thus precludes any real account of practice, change 
through practice, or power; 
the emphasis upon 'engagement' with 'the real' accompanies 
a theoretical carelessness and the outcome is that the 
limiting conditions of observation are not recognized. 
These llmitatlons will 1Je focused in more precise detail in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COMONALITIES AND CONTRASTS 
BETWEEN BERNSTEIN AND WILLIS 
The two main ma.Jar bodies of work consldered in this thesis are 
the theory of language forms and codes proposed by Basil 
Bernstein and the theory of working class sub-culture proposed 
by Paul Willis. Both analyses seek to offer an explanation of 
the educational trajectories of working class children in 
relation to the social/cultural characteristics that are 
themselves a specific product of class position. While these 
analyses are separated in time, the general problem whlch they 
both share is the lack of a coherent theoretical arliculatlon 
between the concepts of class and culture. 
Class and Cultural Production 
The concept of class in both cases is objectivist (taken as a 
'given' fact) and there is no substantial account of what it 
consists in and how it is constituted. Willis refers to its 
constitution through relations of production and focuses on the 
ldea of 'cultural production' (Willis 1977;3). And that is as 
far as the account of class goes. Beyond this characterisation, 
his analysis focuses on the cultural dimension/aspeet of class. 
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Neither &!counL gives specific atLenL.ion Lo economic faclurs .tn 
Lhe furmaLiun of class. 
Bernstein's later analysis sim.ilarly evokes the idea of cullural 
produclion through 'textual product.ion' (1982:307-8), buL slaLes 
that there is only an 'indirect' relationship of cul tw·e to the 
material bcise (1982:309). S.im.ilarly, Willis emphasises the 
partial autonomy of cultural forms and indicates that they are 
not 'produced by simple outside determination' (1977:120). This 
perspective leads Willis to call for 'a theory of advanced 
capitalist working class consciousness and culture sui generis' 
(1977:139,n.4) [original emphasis]. 
Working Class as 'Community' 
The principal differences between the two accounts lie in the 
way the concept of class is focused and in the exposition of 
basic causes of the fonnal:.ion of class. Both analysts posit Lhe 
idea of working class cullure as express.ing and symbollz.ing an 
underlying sense of 'connnunity' which is shared by its members. 
Working class culture in both accounts stands in contrast to the 
ideology of individualism of the dominant class. 
In both analyses the notion of 'connnunity' or 'group' is 
realized by the practices of participants who enforce solidarity 
through a compulsory group logic. Willis focuses upon the 
'informal' group whose practices are particular manifestations 
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of the larger . class culture. Bernstein assllllles the notion of 
corrununity perta.ining to the working class in a more general 
sense which envisages the family as the principal element of 
'community' handing on 'roles' which are of a 'mechanical' 
nature. 1be working class as a whole is not envisaged as one 
g.rd.nd community but its 'roles' relative to the middle class are 
less .individualisLic and more 'communal' in nature. 
Social Identity and Cultural Rationality 
Both analyses are concerned lo address lhe quesL.ion of unequal 
educational attainment and in doing so offer a cultural account 
of class. In both cases the ind..ivid.ual id.entities of agents (or 
subjects) are determined by forms of collective and compulsory 
systems of cognition. These are called tcodes' for ·Bernstein 
and 'cultural logic' for Willis. In Willis 'collective cultural 
processes' (dependent upon 'cultural logic') lead to 'id.entity 
formation' (1983:113). In Bernstein 'codes ... are the creators 
of social identity' (1971:164). Willis is more concerned to 
emphasize the active and volitional elements of the cultural 
productions of agents. Bernstein is concerned to account for 
'agency' in some degree through the interactions of subjects 
(who reali~e codes). Both accounts, however, emphasize the 
social deLermination of action becalli::le the idea of code or 
collec L.i. ve logic is Lhe prevailing concepL. As a resul L in each 
case a strongly functionalist conception of culture emerges from 
a view of class constrained within its autonomous forms of 
meaning. 
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Meaning as Collective Representation 
Both accounts share a remarkable similarity ln the way cultural 
rationality is construed. While both theorists make explicit 
reference to tmeanings' they are both concerned ultimately with 
the idea of unifying 'themes' and cultural processes. 
Bernstein's proposition is that: 
... embedded in the culture of sub-culture may be a 
basic organizing concept, concepts or themes, whose 
ramifications may be diffused throughout the culture or 
sub-culture (1971:164). 
S.imilarly, Willis emphasi:t;es 'central themes' which are the 
prcxiuct of 'class processes' (1977:59; 1977:27). In both 
accounts 'meaning' held by agents 1s seen to express the 
conditions of social structure. In Berstein, social structure is 
a fonnally divided structure which imparts specific sets of 
tmeanings' through codes. In Willis 'meaning' is localed in 
structures, in the implicit and lived meanings of 'cultural 
forms' ( 1983: 137 ,n. 7). Regardless of the specific circumstances 
of sub-cultural production the constraints of the underlying 
class structure are realized through the workings of group 
logic. In both cases, then, the true 'meaning' of people's 
activities lies in the fact that an underlying structure is both 
realizing and symbolizing itself to its members.1 
1 This is a modern recapitulation of Durkheim's central claim in The 
Elementa ry Forms of the Religious Life. 
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Resistance 
The principal difference between lhe lwo theories lies in the 
significance of the concepL of resistance. In Bernstein's 
analysis lhe selecting oul of working class sludenls occurs 
through the clash of already fully formed 'cultures' or systems 
of meaning: 
The working class child i8 concerned mainly wilh the 
presenL, and his social structure, unlike that of the 
middle class child, provides liLLle .incentive or 
purposeful support to make the meLhods and ends of the 
school purposefully meaningful. The problems of 
discipline and elassroom control result not from the 
isolaLed points of resistance or conflict, buL from the 
attempt Lo reorient a whole pattern of pereept.ion with 
its emotional counterpart (1971:36). 
Unlike Will.is, the not.ion of 'resistance' in Bernstein's early 
writing is not a process of active meanlng-making in opposition 
to dominant 'culture' and an act of self-assertion on the part 
of lhe working class students. It is viewed by Bernstein as a 
dysfunctional outcome of the school's attempt to reorient the 
students' 
'cultural' reality, consisting of perceptual and 
emotional elements. The behaviour that results ls not envisaged 
as being particularly meaningful in iLself. It is merely a 
residue of the clash of structural orders where one order, the 
school's, prevails. 
For Willis, on the other hand, 'resistance' is eminently 
meanln.gful behaviour and implies a prior recognition 'at Lhe 
cultural level' of lhe oppressive nalure of the conventions of 
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schoollng and their falseness in relation to later possibiliLies 
in life . The (clash' envisaged by Willis is not a clash of 
fully formed cultures at least Willis wishes lo avoid this 
formula lion. Working class cultural production is described as 
a positive response in opposition to the structures of 
capitalism. However, as previously indicated, Lhere is an 
exLremely strong and unresolved contradiction evident in the 
analysis. The explanat.ion of how all working class sub-cultures 
develop along the same pattern and express Lhe same underlying 
principles of opposition rests on the assert.ion that Lhey are 
all conceived in the same 'determinate conditions' . Cla!:is 
culture .1s envisaged as being developed through the processes of 
schooling but the account insists that it must develop along 
certain lines. There is thus an inevitab.ility, a 'determinism' 
which is impossible to escape. 
Th.is variation in the degree of 'cultural clash' reflects a 
variation in focus. A related contrast occurs between 
Bernstein and Willis on the precise nature of cause. Bernstein 
is concerned to present a causal explanation of working class 
studenL behaviour which accounts for that failure from the first 
day of schooling. Willis, on the other hand, describes how 
groups who are already failing actively reinforce failure. The 
group which is selected for ethnographic analysis is not 
selected primarily because it has something in common buL 
primarily because it .lS already expressing defiance. 
Generalizations about class are made from that point. 
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Dualisms 
There are more general similarities in Lhe basic modes of 
theorizing which Bernstein and Willis use. Bernstein, as 
already indicated, posits logically opposed dualisms as formal 
entities and conducts the ensuing analysis from those entities. 
Willis reacts to Bernstein's 'abstractly multiplying formalism' 
(1983:123) but also depends on formalisms of a different nature 
such as paradox, which becomes a key metaphor in Willis' work. 
This paradox is set up .1n the opening words of Learning to 
Labour: 
The difficult thing to explain about how middle class 
kids get middle class jobs is why others let them. The 
difficult thing to explain about how working class kichi 
get workirig elass jobs 1.s why they let Lhemsel ve::; 
(1977:1). 
Even the idea of resistance as it is conceived .1n Willis' 
analysis contains this metaphor of paradox: 
It is the 
class which 
(1977:122). 
apparent 
brings 
cultural ascen~non of the working 
the hell of its own real present 
It is their very resistance through cultural forms which commits 
working class agents to '::;elf-dwnnation' (1977:3). 
In reacting to the delermin.ism of structural accounts of 
schooling, Will.is empha::;izes the notion of 'ageney'. Agency and 
structures become arrLinomie::;. Willis ind.ieale::; Lhat he hopes to 
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work Uu·ough tsome of U1e endless antinomies be tween 
slructure/agency, pessim.ism/opL.im.ism, resisLance/accommodat.ion' 
(1983:108) buL becomes trapped in them . They are in a real 
sense 'endless'. 111.is kind of .inf onu.i.n.g me Laphor of parddox 
carries in a general way the same, in fact logically opposed, 
dualisms as does Bernstein's theory. Willis' theorizing carries 
qu.ite strong Calvin.istic overtones so that the notion of agency 
beeomes completely subsumed within relentless cultural logle. 
The culture is the agent. While Willis reacts to the 
tpessimism' and tclosure' of reproduction perspectives, the 
invocation of agency as he construes it seems to deepen that 
pessimism. The ma.Jar paradox of Willis' theorizing, however, 
may be in that while he clearly distrusts <theory' and plaees 
great emphasis upon practical analysis, the result of his 
analysis is to ascribe a systematic theoretical and critical 
outlook to the subjects of his study. On the evidence presented 
there ares.imply no grounds for his assertion that working ela8s 
agents 'think like theorists' ( 1983: 114). 
The Concept of Culture and Closure of Class 
If the purpose of fonnal education in complex societies is to 
change the dispositions of students and to open up the 
possibilities of equitable social participation, any social 
account of ed.ucatlon with these alms must explain the apparent 
intractability of members of the working class to change. 
Bernstein's early works suggest that the working class does not 
change because, firstly, its thought-world is different from 
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that of the middle class and sufficient in its own terms; and, 
secondly, the processes of schooling are directed. against i t s 
changing. Willis · seems to suggest that the working class does 
not want to change if that involves conforming to conventions 
which are inherently oppresslve. 
The concept of culture ln both theories 8uggests a Lendency to 
closure and self-sufficiency of the group. In Bernstein this 
closw·e is percelved as a negatlve attribule in Wlllis as 
positive. Whlle Willis does not begin by treating clas8 culture 
as a spa Lio- Lemporal isolate, the informing concept of 
collective logic leads inevitably to depicting the working class 
as an autonomous entity with its own 'ontology' (1983:115). 
Bernstein's early theory is a structuralist theory in the 
tradition of structural-functionalism (after Parsons). Willis' 
theory, while attempting to break from structuralism (after 
Althusser), remains locked within this perspective. The terms 
of the analysis lock it into a series of polarities involving 
structure and agency. 
In contrast with Bernstein's early work, Willis attempts to 
articulate a caU8al relallon between classes. However, the 
closure of the working class is due to the activities of the 
working class llself because Lhe forII18 which Lhey are seen to 
construct are in lJasic ways oppositional to dominant forms. The 
closure then takes the form of a logically articulated system 
which expresses princlples or values of social cohesion which 
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are the logical (and human) opposite of dominant forms. The 
closw·e is f .inally dependen L upon a logical scheme of mean.ings 
bull L as oppos.i tions at key points to dom.inant forms. w11.i.le 
Bernsl:.e.in's early analyses are nol:. as explicit:. about the fonnal 
nalure of oppositions, that they are such is strongly impl.ied. 
There is, on this matter, a fundamental similarity between t he 
two theories. 
The determinism which Willis wishes to avoid is unavoidable 
because the theoretical framework set up implles in his terms an 
'ontology' of class through the workings of a total system of 
collective logic. The analysis rests upon the idea of a 
compulsory system of loglc which provid~s meaning. 
Th.e Limitations of the Concept of Cultural Rationality 
The 1naJor llmitatlons of both Bernstein's and Wlllis' analyses 
lies in a closed and total system of meaning dictated to 
subjects through either code or group logic. This system is in 
a real sense independent of the activities, intentions and 
purposes of its subjects. 
Willis adopts this analytical framework to refute the idea that 
working class subjects can readily adopt the false conventions 
of the dominant class. However, by giving this base of 
compulsory logic to a theory of agency which is not properly 
linked to il he ensures Lhat the outcome is not only an 
.inadequate Lheory but a pol:.enlially dangerous one. Given his 
-112-
emphas.i.s on cholce and lntention, Wlllis is lefL wlU1 no opLion 
buL to asserL that the working class wills its damnation .in Lhe 
very act of collective resistance. In the setting of e<lucaL.i.on 
Lhis assertion .1S open to extremely conservative 
interpretations. 
HlDil8.Ilist and Anthropological Culture 
In the work of Bernstein the concept of culture applied to 
classes is treated as a spatio-temporal isolate. Class cultures 
are .inherently different. In Willis' account the traditional 
applications of the term culture in education are turned 
around. 
lS more 
.ideology. 
group. 
Little reference is made to middle class culture. It 
often described as dominant culture or dominant 
Culture is portrayed as a scheme relative to a 
In this formulation .1n Learning to Labour Lhe working 
class are the true bearers of culture while the dominant class 
are, 1.n a senHe, cullure-less. They are an array of nameless 
.individuals whose interests are expressed through the false 
.ideology of .individualism. They have no collect.ive .identity and 
no group attachments. These kinds of assumptions about the 
respective classes are related in general to other CCCS analyses 
similarly predicated on the idea of an egalitarian impulse among 
oppressed groups. The contrast provided in CCCS studies is 
between the formless impersonality of the dominant class which 
is given to the disintegrating processes of individualism, and 
the humane identity of groups formed through the innate urge to 
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res.ist oppression and create forms of collective life which are 
not oppressive. 
The concept of culture in Willis' study, on the one hand, 
suggests an extremely relativistic application to groups 
perceived essentially as communities. On the other hand, the 
use of the term reflects an inversion of the traditional 
humanist conception of culture so that the working class are the 
true possessors of a potentially integrated spiritual totality 
and 'reason' . They stand in opposit.ion to the dominant class 
whose pr-d.Ct.ices are informed by -U1e 'natural' impulses of 
selfishness and greed. Thus the operation of class in modern 
complex societies is the impediment to full social integration. 
Willis' v1.ew of salvation corresponds to the v1.s1.on of a 
universal class (namely the working class) of the early Marx. 2 
Bernstein also makes the same basic contrast between community 
and individualism in the theory of codes. However, there is 
almost no idealization of the working class in his 
fonnulations. 
rational.ity, 
Rather, 1.n order to progress towards true 
the working class must break away from its 
isolation and closure enforced by meehru1ical bonds, and become 
individuated. The possibility of critique depends upon the 
developnent of individuation by which Lhe 'irrational' adherence 
2A class must be framed which has RADICAL CHAINS, a class in civil 
society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the 
dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society which has a universal 
character because its sufferings are universal. There must be formed a 
sphere of society which claims no tradilitioal status only a human status 
(Marx 1963:190) [original emphasis]. 
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to conventions can be challenged. Bernstein's view of 
salvation Lhus corresponds to Durkheim's ralionalisl .ideal. 
The concept of culture in Bernstein's early works maintains a 
sim.ilar ambivalence to Willis between the traditional humanist 
and anthropological conceptions of culture. Working class 
eulture while ralional in its own way, is a distinct entity but 
its forms and structures are not adequate in then1Belves Lo meel 
the funclional and human nee<l.B of social diversity in complex 
modern societies. In no way do its forms imply a criLique of 
middle principles of cohesion towards whieh iL .LS 
evolving. 
In its fundamental elements Willis' theory may be read as an 
. . inversion of the idea of cultural deprivation which was 
prominent in educational analysis in the 1950s and 60s. This 
idea held tha L 'cul tw·e' , as the true expression of human 
potenLial, exisLed in an indivisible foI1Il and that the working 
class had extremely limited access to it. 
In both theories the concept of class culture implies an 
imperfect 'rationality' within a more universal frame of human 
potential. 
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OONCLUSION 
The general comparison between the respective analyses of 
Bernstein and Willis indicates an increasing emphasis upon 
pract.ice and a corresponding de-emphasis upon the constraints of 
social sLructure. Both theories, however, imply a sharp 
separatlon beLween practice and an underlying sLructure buill 
upon 'logic' lhat is a scheme associated with a not.ion of 
culture which is both a static system of logical categories 
and/or a set of systematic processes. These underlying 
structures based upon 'log.ical' categories and principles ensure 
that whatever 'transformation' of structure takes place does 
so in a particular Wd.Y. The outcome of this theoretical stance 
is that an underlying structure is given 8.8 prior to any 
practice and therefore limlLs absolutely the possibilities of 
practice. 
between 
At a basic level there is, therefore, no difference 
Bernstein's codes and attendant roles and Willis' 
description of culture as agent. 
In moving away from the idea of a 'natural' distribution of 
logic, Bernstein has followed a line of s~iology dating back to 
Durkheim, which proposes that the idea of 'logic' has to be 
framed withln the functional nee<l8 of society, and that the 
primary need ls social cohesion. Will.is unintentionally adopts 
this stance. There are, therefore, socially generated logical 
.imperatives lo wh.ich pr-cl.Ct.ice or soc.ial action musL conform. 
When linked to a concept of class, this functional logic lim.its 
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Lhe possibilities of 's truggle' to a defined set of 
'opposit.ional' out.comes . In Willis these outcomes aga.in conform 
Lo a funcL.ional logic in that they merely serve the prime 
function of social cohesion of U1e working class. Failure 
becomes 'positively expressive'. The theory, .in short, leads Lo 
a c.irculariLy which cannot be escaped. 
Both theories are unable to give adequate causal accounts of 
unequal e<lucaLional outcomes between classes, or to provide 
plans of action which can lead to a genuine transfor,nation of 
lhe structures of power within schooling. Despite Willis' 
protestations about agency, production and 'tra.nsformaLion' his 
theory precludes any truly historical treatmenL of causes. The 
'cultural moment' (1983:112) which he refers to 1.s not a moment 
of, to use his term, 'meaning making' (1983:112). It 1.s a 
moment of class subjects receiving a pre-given meaning. The 
outcome 1.s that the 'meaning' which is received is not only the 
outcome of a prior 'logic' but the oppressed practice which 
ensues from it ls itself 'symbolic' . An ethnography built upon 
these closed theoretical presumptions can only confir,n them. 
If there is Lo be a positive move towards an adequate causal 
account of social factors operating through schooling then the 
basic presumptions of this llieory must be challenged. What is 
required is an account of structures (i.e. that which gives 
conventional form to social life) emerging from practice or 
social act.ion itself, not from essential meanings, formed by 
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a-:-pr.1ori schemes of logic. Such an account would not reduce the 
l.imiLations imposed on practice by maLerial conditions to a 
question of 'meaning' . 
The unrecognized nature of essential meanings and logics of 
class-culture .1s not the starting point for an adequate analysis 
of the phenomenon of unequal outcomes in education, or the basis 
for programs-of intervention. A reformist program must identify 
class-based practices of students. A second step is to identify 
the limilations imposed by conventions established oulside Lhe 
school in relation to educational aims based upon principles of 
equity. A Lhird step is to establish educalional practices 
which challenge limiting convenlioru:i. This requires at its base 
a Lheory of social aclion in which Lhe prrnry concepL is social 
action itself. 
More broadly, the works of Bernstein and Willis show in a 
concrete form the problems inherent in any theory that views 
practice as an execution of culture. The differences between 
Bernstein and Willis, and more importantly, their similarities, 
show that these problems are not resolved by the simple addition 
of the concept of agency to tr-dditional conceptions of structure 
to form the structure/agency couple. 
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APPENDIX 
REVISIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF RESISTANCE 
The prominent American educational theorists, Aronw.itz and 
Giroux (1985) make a number of .important criticisms of 
'resistance theory' as proposed by Willis and other analyses 
(emerging from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies). 
In brief these are as follows. 
While resistance theories point to schools as social 
tsites' in which 'dominant culture is encountered and 
challenged by subordinate groups, they do not adequately 
conceptualize the historical development of the conditions 
that promote and reinforce contradictory mcxies of 
resistance and struggle' (1985:99). 
Not all 'opposition.al' behaviour ls a clear cul response 
to domination, i.e. dominant forms transmitted by the 
school, and proper analysis must distinguish between those 
behaviours which have a 'radical significance' and those 
which do not (1985:99). In some cases students may be 
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totally indifferent to the ideology of the school with its 
respective rewards and demands (1985:101). Furt hermore , 
behavlour may be Lhe result of compliance to larger 
ideological forces - such as racism and sexism - and have 
nothing to do with 'resistance'. That is domination is 
not singularly informed or exhausted by the logic of class 
oppression (1985:102). 
Analyses of resistance have therefore tended to 
romarrllc.ize or .idealize certain reactionary views 
especially in relation to race and gender. 
Resistance theories have tended to focus on overt acLs of 
rebellious student behaviour misconstruing the 
significance of overt rebelliousness and ignoring less 
obvious forms of resistance. Less obvious forms of 
resistance such as humour used by students to disrupt 
class routines may be a more positive focus for future 
analyses in that such practices allow students to continue 
to participate while 'resisting'. Such forms do not 
render students powerless in the long term. 
While some students are able to 'see through' the lies and 
contradictions of dominant school ideology, they do not 
necessarily decide to translate such insights into extreme 
and debilitating fornl8 of rebelliousness. 
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TI1is .1s a ralher different view of reslsLance Lhan that proposed 
uy Wlllls, who sees Lhe ldea of tcounter-school culLure' as 
produclng, al best, only seml-consclous awareness and Lherefore 
leadirig Lo obl.i.gatory behavlours which are lhen termed 
t res is Lance' . Aronow .i. t'.6 and Giroux see U1e knowledge 
transmitted by the school as at least partially valuable, and 
not totally wrought by dominant ideology. Most importantly, 
.- they see current theories of resistance neglecting the issue of 
how resistance theory can be used to develop a 'critical 
pedagogy', 'which takes the notion of emancipation as its 
guiding interest' (1985:105). 
That is, the nature and meaning of an act of 
resistance must be defined by the degree to which it 
contains possibilities to develop what Herbert 
Marcuse termed 'a corrnni trnent to emancipation of 
sensibility, imagination and reason in all spheres of 
subjectivity and objectivity' (1985:105). 
That .1s, the significance of practices must be judged .1n 
reference to the 'emancipatory' capacity which they hold. 
Having made such criticisms Aronowitz and Giroux suggest the 
following outline of a 'cultural studies' approach. 
In the concept of cultural production we find the 
basis for a theory of hlUila.Il agency, one which is 
constructed through the active, ongoing, collective 
medium of oppressed groups' experiences .... As Willis 
suggests, theories of resistance point to new ways of 
constructing a radical pedagogy by developing 
analyses of the ways in which class and culture 
combine to offer lhe outlines of 'cultural 
politics'. Al the core of such a politics is a 
semiotic reading of the style, rituals, language and 
cultural terrains of suoordinate groups. Through 
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this process .i.l becomes possible Lo analyze whaL 
counLerhegemonic elements such cultural fields 
conLain, and how they Lend to become incorporaLed 
inLo Lhe dominanL culLure and subsequenLly sLripped 
uf Lhe.i.r pol.i.Lical possibiliLies. ImpliciL .i.n such 
an analysis .Ls the need Lo develop straLegies .Ln 
schools .Ln wh.i.ch oppositional cultures rnighL be 
rescued from the processes of incorporation to 
provide Lhe basis for a viable political force 
(1985:98-99). 
The basic premise in th.i.s account is the idea of a counLer 
culture, that is, a spontaneously occurring class identity which 
rests on collective experience formed in class opposition and 
which is tsignificant' and 'meaningful' to its members. 
Neverlhele::,s, some of the basic problem assoc.i.ated with Will.is' 
of cultural ::,Lud.i.es rema.1ns the po ten t.i.al 
over-aseripl.i.on of significanee and meaning to the soc.i.al 
practices and beliefs of oppressed groups by consLru.ing these 
practices as oppositional manifestations of a larger class 
structure. 
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